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There is consensus that activation within distributed functional brain networks underlies 
human thought. The impact of this consensus is limited, however, by a gap that exists between 
data-driven correlational analyses that specify where functional brain activity is localized using 
fMRI, and neural process accounts that specify how neural activity unfolds through time to give 
rise to behavior. Here, we show how an integrative cognitive neuroscience approach may bridge 
this gap. In an exemplary study of visual working memory, we use multi-level Bayesian statistics 
to demonstrate that a neural dynamic model simultaneously explains behavioral data and predicts 
localized patterns of brain activity, outperforming standard analytic approaches to fMRI. The 
model explains performance on both correct trials and incorrect trials where errors in change 
detection emerge from neural fluctuations amplified by neural interaction. Critically, predictions 
of the model run counter to cognitive theories of the origin of errors in change detection. Results 
reveal neural patterns predicted by the model within regions of the dorsal attention network that 
have been the focus of much debate. The model-based analysis suggests that key areas in the 
dorsal attention network such as the intraparietal sulcus play a central role in change detection 
rather than working memory maintenance, counter to previous interpretations of fMRI studies. 
More generally, the integrative cognitive neuroscience approach used here establishes a 
framework for directly testing theories of cognitive and brain function using the combined power 
of behavioral and fMRI data.  
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Although great strides have been made in understanding the brain using data-driven 
methods (Smith et al., 2009), to understand the brain’s complexity, psychological and brain 
sciences will need sophisticated theories (Gerstner, Sprekeler, & Deco, 2012). But what would a 
good theory of brain function look like? (This question was posed in a July 11, 2014 New York 
Times Opinion Page by Gary Marcus: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/12/opinion/the-trouble-
with-brain-science.html). Addressing this question requires theories that bridge the disparate 
scientific languages of neuroscience and psychology: we must create psychological explanations 
for behavior using neural process accounts, and neuroscientific theories of brain function that 
make sense of behavior. In short, bridge theories must explain what the brain is doing in real-
time to generate specific patterns of neural and behavioral data (for related ideas see, O’Reilly, 
2006). 
Bridging brain and behavior may seem like a central goal in the psychological and brain 
sciences; however, this goal has rarely been directly realized. Many theories in psychology focus 
on cognitive processes with a primary goal of explaining behavioral data (Anderson et al., 2004; 
Bays, Catalao, & Husain, 2009; Brady & Tenenbaum, 2013). Other theories focus on neural 
processes with a primary goal of explaining neural data (Brunel & Wang, 2001; Deco, Rolls, & 
Horwitz, 2004; Domijan, 2011; Edin, Macoveanu, Olesen, Tegnér, & Klingberg, 2007; Raffone 
& Wolters, 2001). Rarely is the same model used to generate both behavioral and neural data, 
that is, simultaneously integrating both cognitive and neural processes (Wijeakumar, Ambrose, 
Spencer, & Curtu, 2016). This level of explanation is arguably the most critical, however, 
because it can explain how neural processes give rise to cognition and behavior (see Palmeri, 
Turner, & Love, 2017 for a special issue devoted to this topic). 
To illustrate, consider the current state of theory within the domain of visual working 
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memory (VWM). VWM is central cognitive system used to remember visual information during 
short term delays and compare visual items that cannot be simultaneously foveated (for a review 
see Luck & Vogel, 2013). For instance, VWM is often probed in the change detection task 
(Cowan, 2001; Luck & Vogel, 1997; Pashler, 1988). In this task, participants are shown a 
memory array consisting of 1-8 objects (e.g., colored squares). After a brief delay (e.g., 1s), 
participants are shown a test array and asked to determine whether all the items are the same or 
different. Results from this task have revealed that VWM has a highly limited capacity. Although 
estimates vary across studies, it is generally accepted that people can store only 2-4 items in 
VWM at one time  (Cowan, 2001; Luck & Vogel, 1997; Pashler, 1988; Rouder, Morey, Morey, 
& Cowan, 2011). 
According to one prominent view, these capacity limits reflect the functioning of a 
memory system that stores a limited number of fixed-resolution representations in independent 
memory ‘slots’ (Cowan, 2001; Luck & Vogel, 1997; Pashler, 1988; Zhang & Luck, 2008). An 
alternative view holds that VWM is better conceived of as a shared resource that can be flexibly 
distributed among the items making up a scene, with no fixed upper limit on the number of items 
that can be stored (Bays et al., 2009; Bays & Husain, 2008; Wilken & Ma, 2004). There have 
been a host of recent modeling efforts designed to contrast these two perspectives using Bayesian 
approaches (e.g., Brady & Tenenbaum, 2013; Donkin et al., 2013; Kary et al., 2016; Rouder et 
al., 2008; Sims et al., 2012) and efforts to expand these views using drift diffusion models 
(Sewell, Lilburn, & Smith, 2016). In all cases, these studies use mathematical models to 
instantiate conceptual claims about VWM and test these claims at the level of behavior, typically 
using proportion correct, although some recent papers have also examined reaction times 
(Donkin et al., 2013; Sewell et al., 2016), VWM confidence (van den Berg, Yoo, & Ma, 2017), 
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feature chunking (Brady & Tenenbaum, 2013), and psychometric functions for difference 
detection (Sims et al., 2012) or feature estimation with models that do not have strict limits on 
slots or resources (Oberauer & Lin, 2017; Swan & Wyble, 2014). None of these models have 
been used to explain patterns of neural data, nor were they designed to do so.  
Other theories of VWM have focused on the neural bases of this cognitive system. fMRI 
research shows that a distributed network of frontal and posterior cortical regions underlies 
change detection performance. VWM representations are thought to be actively maintained in 
the intraparietal sulcus (IPS), the DLPFC, the ventral-occipital (VO) cortex for color stimuli, and 
the lateral-occipital complex (LOC) for shape stimuli (Todd & Marois, 2004, 2005). In addition, 
there is suppression of the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) during the delay interval, and 
activation of the ACC during the comparison phase (Mitchell & Cusack, 2008; Todd, Fougnie, & 
Marois, 2005). Moreover, there is greater activation of this network on change versus no change 
trials, and the hemodynamic response on error trials tends to be less robust (Pessoa, Gutierrez, 
Bandettini, & Ungerleider, 2002; Pessoa & Ungerleider, 2004). 
Efforts to understand the theoretical bases of VWM at the neural level have focused on 
the biophysical properties that give rise to sustained activation—the putative neural basis of 
VWM representations (Constantinidis & Steinmetz, 1996; Fuster & Alexander, 1971; Miller, 
Erickson, & Desimone, 1996; Moody, Wise, di Pellegrino, & Zipser, 1998). There have been 
quite detailed biophysical accounts of how networks of neurons give rise to sustained activation. 
These models have been used to explain both neurophysiological data (Brunel & Wang, 2001; 
Compte, Brunel, Goldman-Rakic, & Wang, 2000) and, in some cases, aspects of fMRI signals 
(Deco et al., 2004; Domijan, 2011; Edin et al., 2007). Other models have explored the possibility 
that VWM representations are encoded in terms of neural synchrony across neuronal assemblies 
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(Raffone & Wolters, 2001), while recent work has also raised the possibility that working 
memory performance reflects the reactivation of representations from ‘memory-silent’ neural 
codes (Rose et al., 2016; Sprague, Ester, & Serences, 2016; cf., Schneegans & Bays, 2017). 
Although these models explain how neural processes can encode and maintain visual 
information, they have not been used to capture any behavioral data from VWM paradigms. This 
is not surprising. Biophysical models are computationally complex; thus, simulating behavioral 
performance across many iterations of the model is often not a realistic goal. 
There are some models that have the potential to bridge the gap between brain and 
behavior. These models use variants of neuronal dynamics. For instance, Swan and Wyble 
(2014) proposed a model of VWM with some neural dynamics; however, these dynamics were 
discrete and activation levels were updated in one-shot steps at encoding and retrieval making a 
direct link to real-time neural measures not possible. Similarly, Oberauer and Lin (2017) 
proposed a model inspired by a connectionist network using the concept of neural activation; 
however, there was no attempt to simulate real-time neural dynamics directly. In both of these 
papers, the focus was solely on simulating behavioral data.  
In summary, then, although understanding how the brain gives rise to behavior is clearly 
an important goal, this goal has been rarely addressed within the domain of visual working 
memory. We contend that research on VWM is not unique in this regard. Creating theories that 
bridge between these levels of analysis is fundamentally challenging as highlighted in a recent 
special issue on model-based fMRI (Turner, Forstmann, Love, Palmeri, & Van Maanen, 2016). 
Model-based fMRI is a promising approach to understanding human cognitive neuroscience that 
uses computational models of cognitive processes to link brain and behavior. Turner and 
colleagues reviewed the current state of the literature, highlighting many exciting approaches, 
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but they also revealed a fundamental challenge: very few approaches create a direct mapping 
between brain and behavior. This is what they call integrative cognitive neuroscience (ICN). The 
goal of ICN is to develop a model where one can tune parameters to achieve good fits to both 
brain and behavior and, reversely, that brain and behavioral measures can feed back to inform 
the quality of the model/theory. 
We pursue an ICN approach here within the domain of VWM. We begin with a Dynamic 
Field Theory (DFT) of VWM that has shown promise by generating novel, a priori behavioral 
predictions that run counter to other cognitive models of visual working memory (Johnson, 
Ambrose, van Lamsweerde, Dineva, & Spencer, submitted; Johnson, Spencer, Luck, & Schöner, 
2009). Critically, this theory also simulates neural population activation on a millisecond 
timescale and explains how neural activation in the brain is turned into a behavioral decision on 
each trial. This is not done using an algorithmic mapping of activation to behavioral measures; 
rather, the model actively generates a decision on each trial via the activation of a neural decision 
system engaged during the comparison process. Thus, in DFT there is not brain at one level and 
behavior at another. Rather, brain measures and behavioral outcomes both arise from neural 
population dynamics. The result is an integrative cognitive neuroscience (ICN) model that 
directly simulates both neural activation and behavior. 
The goal of the paper is to test the DF model of VWM with fMRI. We do this first by 
simulating previous fMRI findings from the literature, simultaneously fitting the model to both 
behavioral and fMRI data. This yields an initial set of model parameters we can use to generate 
novel neural predictions. It also leads to a discovery: what was thought to be a neural signature 
of working memory – an asymptote at high memory loads – may actually be a neural signature 
of brain regions coupled to working memory rather than a signature of working memory per se. 
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Our model also explains why this asymptote does not occur in paradigms using a longer memory 
delay. 
Next, we test a set of novel neural predictions generated by the DF model. One of the 
unique features of the model is that it specifies the neural processes that underlie both correct and 
incorrect trials in the change detection task (Johnson, Simmering, & Buss, 2014). Consequently, 
an optimal way to test the model is in a change detection task that has high numbers of correct 
and incorrect trials. Thus, we created a novel experiment that optimized participants’ 
performance so they generated many errors, but maintained performance at above-chance levels. 
We then used this paradigm in a task-based fMRI study conducted using a 3T MRI scanner.  
But how do we know if the DF model provides a good account of these data? Ideally, we 
would test the model against a competing theory of VWM; however, as our review above 
indicates, no other theory of VWM simultaneously predicts both neural and behavioral data. 
Thus, we tested the model against a standard statistical model. The idea here was simple: 
typically, fMRI data are analyzed using a general linear modelling (GLM) approach with 
regressors for each factor in the experiment. In order for the DF model to be useful, it should – at 
the very least – capture more variance than the standard statistical model. To evaluate this, we 
used Bayesian linear multi-variate modeling to evaluate the DF model’s ability to capture data 
from 23 regions of interest (ROIs) relative to different variants of a task-based GLM. A 
Variational Bayes algorithm (Roberts & Penny, 2002) was then used to estimate the model 
evidence which takes into account model fit but also penalizes models for their complexity 
(Bishop, 2006). Finding the best model over a group of subjects was then implemented using 
Random Effects Bayesian Model Selection (Rigoux, Stephan, Friston, & Daunizeau, 2014; 
Stephan, Penny, Daunizeau, Moran, & Friston, 2009). Results show that the DF model 
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outperforms the standard statistical model. Further, the mapping of model components to ROIs 
provides a novel functional picture of how the brain implements VWM across a distributed 
network. Critically, this analysis reveals not only where VWM lives in the brain, but which brain 
areas implement which functions. 
The paper is organized as follows. We first describe the theory we test, including 
background on the larger theoretical framework this theory is embedded within, Dynamic Field 
Theory. Next, we derive a mapping from neural activity in the model to hemodynamic responses 
measured with fMRI and contrast this with other approaches to model-based fMRI. Our 
objective here is to highlight how the dynamic field approach is an example of integrative 
cognitive neuroscience (Turner et al., 2016). We then ask if this approach yields useful 
information by simulating – for the first time – a key finding from the literature using a neural 
process model. We then generate a set of novel predictions and test them in an fMRI experiment, 
using a GLM-based approach to model testing. We conclude with an evaluation of our 
integrative cognitive neuroscience approach—have we achieved a model that effectively bridges 
between brain and behavior? We address this question by placing our approach within the 
context of the theoretical literature on VWM and contrasting our model with other psychological 
and neuroscience models in the field. 
 A Dynamic Field Theory of Visual Working Memory 
The model we evaluate was developed within the framework of Dynamic Field Theory 
(Schoner, Spencer, & DFT Research Group, 2016). Thus, we begin with a brief review of the 
concepts of DFT. This theoretical framework has a long history in psychology and neuroscience 
dating back almost 30 years (Buss & Spencer, 2014, 2018; Buss, Wifall, Hazeltine, & Spencer, 
2014; Erlhagen & Schöner, 2002; Kopecz & Schöner, 1995; Perone, Molitor, Buss, Spencer, & 
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Samuelson, 2015; Perone, Simmering, & Spencer, 2011; Schöner & Thelen, 2006; Schutte & 
Spencer, 2009; Schutte, Spencer, & Schoner, 2003; Simmering, 2016; Simmering & Spencer, 
2008; Thelen, Schöner, Scheier, & Smith, 2001). Readers are referred to our recent book for a 
more complete introduction (Gregor Schoner et al., 2016). 
Activity within populations of cortical neurons is hypothesized to be the best neural 
correlate of behavioral performance (Cohen & Newsome, 2008). Thus, we anchor our approach 
at this level. In particular, the theory we evaluate—a dynamic field theory (DFT) of VWM 
(Johnson, Spencer, Luck, et al., 2009; Johnson, Spencer, & Schöner, 2009)—simulates the 
activity of neural populations from millisecond-to-millisecond as the neural dynamic network 
engages in a particular working memory task.  
A central issue in neural population dynamics is stability—how does a neural population 
stabilize a particular pattern through time (Amari, 1977; Grossberg, 1982; Wilson & Cowan, 
1972). This can be formalized using the language of dynamical system theory. Specifically, one 
can think about how the activity of a neural population, u, changes through time, ?̇?, as a function 
of its current state and other inputs to the population. These dynamics can be formalized as 
follows: ?̇? = 	−𝑢 + ℎ (1) 
where ?̇? is the rate of change in activation through time, u is the current state of 
activation, and h is a collection of inputs to the field that, when summed, modulate the resting 
level of the population. 
If we plot the phase portrait of this system, that is, a plot of the system in the space u by ?̇?, we see that the system is a linear dynamical system (see red line in Figure 1A). There is a 
special place in this linear plot where ?̇? = 0. If activation, u, is set to this value, then the rate of 
MODEL-BASED	fMRI		 	 11		
change is 0 and the system will stay put—it won’t change through time. This special place in the 
phase portrait is called an attractor. In equation 1, h is the attractor state – when activation 
reaches this value, the rate of change in activation is zero (if u = h, then ?̇? = 0). 
If we plot the behavior of this neural dynamic system through time, we can see that it 
stays near this attractor position. This is readily apparent when we add some neural noise to the 
equation, x(t). For instance, in Figure 1B, we start the neural population at a random value near h 
and simulate the dynamics through time, adding a random value to the system at each time point 
(see x-axis). For the first 250 time steps, we keep h at the value -4 (see green line), and the 
system randomly wanders up and down, but always stays near h. After 250 time steps, we then 
boost h to the value -2 (see the magenta line in Figure 1A). This is like boosting the overall 
excitability of the neural population (a common form of neural interaction in the brain, see 
Bastian, Riehle, Erlhagen, & Schöner, 1998). The system jumps up to the activation value -2 (see 
Figure 1B), quickly finding the new attractor state. After another 500 time steps, we return h to 
the value -4. Again, the activation quickly moves to the new attractor state and stays around this 
value.  
Although this captures some features of neural population dynamics, this simple 
dynamical system fails to capture that neural populations are inherently non-linear. For instance, 
neural populations often require a robust input to ‘turn on’, and once they are ‘on’, they are often 
‘sticky’ – they stay ‘on’ even when there is relatively little input (e.g., see Hock, Kelso, & 
Schöner, 1993). This type of non-linearity can be captured by adding a sigmoidal function to the 
equation: ?̇? = -u + h + c*g(u) + x(t) (2) 
Where  
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g(u) = 1 / (1 + exp(-β(u))) (3) 
The sigmoidal function, g(u), has ‘output’ that varies between 0 and 1. β defines the 
steepness of the transition from 0 to 1, and this function is typically centered around a threshold 
value of 0 activation. Thus, as activation, u, increases from a negative ‘resting’ level toward 0, 
the sigmoidal function starts producing positive output. At an activation value of 0, the sigmoidal 
function outputs a value of 0.5. And at higher positive activation values, the sigmoidal function 
saturates at an output of 1.0. Note that the ‘output’ of the sigmoidal function is multiplied by a 
connection strength, c, in equation 2.  
To understand the consequence of this sigmoidal function, consider the phase portrait of 
this new system in Figure 1C when h = -4 (red line). Notice the S-shaped bend in the system as it 
approaches the value u = 0 (the threshold value). We can see that at negative values of u (when 
g(u) = 0), the system follows the equation ?̇?	= -u + h, while at large positive values of u (when 
g(u) = 1), the system follows the equation ?̇? = -u + h + c. Importantly, however, there is still 
only a single attractor state at h = -4 (see black square). Consequently, this system will always 
stay near this attractor state. This is shown in Figure 1D. Note how the system behaves just like 
the linear system for the first 250 time steps. 
Critically, when we boost h from -4 to -2 as before, the non-linear system goes through a 
bifurcation, that is, the attractor layout changes (see magenta line in Figure 1C). Now the system 
has two attractor states – one near -2 (the new ‘resting’ level defined by h) and one at +3 (the 
value h + c, where c = 5 in this example). Moreover, in between these two attractors is a repeller 
indicated by the diamond. Figure 1D shows that this changes how the neural population behaves 
through time. When the excitability of the neural population is boosted by raising h to -2, the 
system quickly moves to this new attractor state. However, after another 250 time steps (around 
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time point 500) the system jumps to the value h+c and remains stably activated in this ‘on’ state 
through time. The behavior of this system inspires an analogy—the neural population has 
detected the presence of a weak input, and the system has kicked itself into an ‘on’ state. Note 
that this state is stable, but not permanent. For instance, once we decrease h back to the initial 
‘resting’ value at time step 750 (see green line in Figure 1D), the activation eventually settles 
back to the original attractor state. This is reflected in Figure 1C—recall that at a low h value, 
there is only one stable attractor state. 
This non-linear dynamical system captures several key properties of neural population 
dynamics (e.g., bi-stability; see Tegnér, Compte, & Wang, 2002); however, the system can only 
represent that something is present or absent (i.e., that activation is high or low). To enrich the 
system, we need to think about how to represent the dimensions within which the neural system 
is embedded. In DFT, this is done by thinking about the tuning curves of neurons in a population. 
Neurons in cortex are sensitive to particular types of information, typically in a graded way. For 
instance, some neurons are ‘tuned’ to spatial dimensions (Constantinidis & Steinmetz, 2001)—
they prefer stimuli, say, to the left side of the retina. Other neurons are ‘tuned’ to color 
dimensions (Matsumora, Koida, & Komatsu, 2008; Xiao, Wang, & Felleman, 2003)—they like 
blue hues. Importantly, these tuning functions are typically quite broad (Wachtler, Sejnowski, & 
Albright, 2003); this means a color neuron will respond really vigorously to blue hues, but also 
quite a bit to cyan, and maybe even a bit to pink as well. 
How do we incorporate these tuning functions into the neuronal dynamics picture? We 
can integrate these concepts using dynamic fields (DFs) where each neuron contributes its tuning 
curve weighted by its current firing rate to an activation field (Erlhagen et al., 1999). This tuning 
of neural units creates a direct link between activation fields in DFT and task dimensions varied 
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in experiments that has predicted a wide range of behavioral data (Buss & Spencer, 2014; Buss 
et al., 2014; Johnson, Spencer, Luck, et al., 2009). To make this concrete, let’s start with 100 
neural sites instead of just one. Each site will have the same neural dynamics as before; however, 
now that we have 100 neural sites, we have to think about how they are connected to one another 
across the cortical field. We will wire them up using a canonical lateral connectivity pattern with 
local excitation and surround inhibition (Amari, 1977; Compte et al., 2000; Wilson & Cowan, 
1972), and the ‘ordering’ of sites along the represented dimension will be based on their tuning 
curves. This means that neurons that ‘like’ similar spatial locations or similar colors will pass 
strong, reciprocal excitation to one another because they are close together in the field, while 
neural sites that ‘like’ very different locations or colors will share reciprocal inhibition because 
they are far apart in the field. Mathematically, this can be summarized as follows (Amari, 1977; 
Wilson & Cowan, 1972): 𝜏)?̇?(𝑥, 𝑡) = 	−𝑢(𝑥, 𝑡) + ℎ + 𝑠(𝑥, 𝑡) + ∫𝑐)2𝑥 − 𝑥′3𝑔 5𝑢2𝑥′, 𝑡36𝑑𝑥′ −
∫ 𝑐82𝑥 − 𝑥′3𝑔 5𝑢2𝑥′, 𝑡36𝑑𝑥′ + 	𝜉2𝑥′, 𝑡3							(4) 
Note the similarities to the neuronal dynamics in equation 2; however, now activation is 
distributed over the behavioral dimension, x (e.g., color). Similarly, inputs, s(x,t), are distributed 
over x; thus, a red input (x = 25) is different from a blue input (x = 60). The laterally excitatory 
connections are defined by ce (an excitatory Gaussian connection matrix), while the inhibitory 
connections are defined by ci (an inhibitory Gaussian connection matrix). As before, these are 
convolved with the sigmoidal function, g(u). This means that only above-threshold sites in the 
field contribute to neural interactions, that is, to local excitation and surround inhibition. Neural 
interactions for each location, x, are evaluated relative to every other position in the field, x’. 
Lastly, τe specifies the timescale over which excitation evolves in the field. 
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To understand the consequences of the lateral connectivity in a dynamic field – how 
neural sites talk to one another based on their neural tuning – it is useful to first plot activation 
with connectivity and the sigmoidal function turned off. Figure 1E shows the same type of 
simulation as in Figure 1A-B where we start with low excitability, then boost excitation locally, 
and then return to a lower resting level. Now, however, we do the boosting by giving a color 
input to the field centered at value 25 (see grey ‘shadow’ along the feature axis). Specifically, the 
input is off for 250 time steps, then on for 500 time steps, and then weaker for the last 250 time 
steps. As can be seen in Figure 1E, the activation in the dynamic field just mimics the input 
through time (see light grey ‘shadow’ projected along the back wall of the image). Thus, without 
any lateral connectivity or sigmoidal modulation, the activation is feed-forward / input-driven.  
Figure 1F shows the same input sequence, but now with lateral connectivity and 
sigmoidal modulation switched on (akin to the simulation in Figure 1C-D). Initially, the cortical 
field is stably at rest, that is, at the value defined by h. At time 250, the color is presented and 
sites that are ‘tuned’ to red are activated. Around time step 500, noise fluctuations boost several 
sites around color value 25 into the ‘on’ state – they go above-threshold as defined by the 
sigmoidal function. Consequently, these neural sites start passing activation to their ‘neighbors’. 
The result is the large ‘peak’ of activation centered over color value 25. The shadow along the 
feature axis shows the structure of this peak – one can see strong local excitation with inhibitory 
‘troughs’ on either side of the peak.  
Peaks in dynamic fields are the basic unit of representation accounting for detection, 
selection, and working memory cognitive states. Peaks are a stable attractor state of the neural 
population. Note how the peak in Figure 1F retains it shape through time, even amidst the neural 
noise evident in this simulation. This attractor state is not permanent, however; once the strength 
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of input is reduced, the peak reduces in strength, eventually relaxing back to the original resting 
level. More interestingly – as we show below – we can increase the strength of neural 
interactions in the field by increasing the strength of local excitation and surround inhibition and 
activation peaks show a form of working memory: peaks of activation can be stably maintained 
through time even when the input is removed (Fuster & Alexander, 1971).  
Recent work has offered more biophysically detailed models of these base functions 
(Deco et al., 2004; Durstewitz, Seamans, & Sejnowski, 2000; Wei, Wang, & Wang, 2012), 
showing how spiking networks together with synaptic dynamics can reproduce, for instance, a 
sustained activation ‘peak’ (often called a ‘bump’ attractor). Although these newer models are 
computationally more detailed, we can ask: is all of this detail necessary for linking brain and 
behavior? Critically, there are drawbacks to this level of detail: the link of biophysical models to 
behavioral data is much weaker than for DFT, and the number of parameters and range of 
dynamical states are much larger. Thus, we do not anchor our account at this level. Nevertheless, 
there are links between DFT and biophysical models: under simplified assumptions, the 
population-level neural dynamics of DFT may be obtained from the Mean Field approximation 
(Faugeras, Touboul, & Cessac, 2009). We leverage this understanding here to derive a 
relationship between DFT and fMRI, adapting biophysical accounts for how neural activity gives 
rise to the BOLD signal (Deco et al., 2004; Logothetis, Pauls, Augath, Trinath, & Oeltermann, 
2001). 
The link between DFT and the Mean Field approximation establishes that there is a 
theoretical connection between neural population dynamics in DFT and theories of spiking 
network activity. We can also ask if this connection extends beyond theory to practice—can we 
directly measure properties of neural population dynamics captured by DFT in real brains? This 
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issue was initially explored using multi-unit neurophysiology in the 1990s. In several studies of 
neural activity in premotor cortex, results showed that predictions of DF models of motor 
planning were evident in multi-unit recordings from premotor cortical neurons (Bastian et al., 
1998; Bastian, Schoner, & Riehle, 2003; Erlhagen et al., 1999; Jancke et al., 1999). More 
recently, this connection has been explored using voltage-sensitive dye imaging in visual cortex 
(Markounikau, Igel, Grinvald, & Jancke, 2010). Again, properties of neural population dynamics 
in DF models such as slowing of neural responses due to laterally-inhibitory interactions were 
evident in cortical recordings. From these examples, we conclude that DFT offers a good 
approximation of the dynamics of populations of neurons in cortex. This sets the stage to expand 
this line of work to human cognitive neuroscience techniques such as fMRI. 
We have now reviewed the basic concepts of neural population dynamics in cortical 
fields that underlie DFT. The next step is to couple multiple DFs together to create a neural 
architecture that implements specific cognitive processes in a neural way. In the next section, we 
describe a neural architecture designed to capture how people encode and consolidate features in 
VWM, how they remember these features during a delay, and how they compare these 
remembered features with the features in a test array to generate ‘same’ and ‘different’ decisions.  
A Dynamic Field model of VWM 
We situate the dynamic field (DF) model within the canonical task used to study VWM—
the change detection task (Luck & Vogel, 1997). Participants are shown a sample array with 
multiple objects. After a delay, a test array is displayed and participants decide whether the 
sample and test arrays are the ‘same’ or ‘different’. Previous work has focused on encoding and 
maintenance in this task, resulting in debates about whether VWM consists of fixed-resolution 
“slots” (Luck & Vogel, 1997) or a distributed resource (Bays & Husain, 2008). Other work has 
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investigated the biophysical properties of neural networks that give rise to sustained activation in 
VWM (Wei et al., 2012). Critically, detecting change requires that encoding and maintenance be 
integrated with comparison. The DF model provides the only formal account that specifies how 
this integration occurs in a neural system to generate ‘same’ and ‘different’ responses (Johnson 
et al., 2014; Johnson, Spencer, Luck, et al., 2009). 
Figure 2 shows the architecture of the DF model (see Supplemental Information for 
model equations and parameters). The model consists of four components that are interconnected 
yet serve particular functional roles (see Tables S1-S2 and Supplemental Information). The 
contrast field (CF) and WM layers have populations of color-sensitive neurons that build ‘peaks’ 
of activation through local-excitatory connections reflecting the presented colors (see also Engel 
& Wang, 2011). Inputs are presented strongly to the CF layer which leads to the formation of 
peaks of activation within this field during stimulus presentation. These peaks then send 
activation to the WM field which also builds peaks of activation at the location of the inputs (see 
peaks in WM layer in Figure 2). Both fields pass inhibition to one another through a shared 
inhibitory layer (not visualized in Figure 2 for simplicity). Through this pattern of coupling, the 
model dynamics operate such that CF becomes suppressed (see inhibitory profile in CF layer in 
Figure 2) once items are consolidated within the WM field and the inputs are removed. When 
items are re-presented at test, inputs that match peaks in WM will be suppressed in CF, while 
non-matching inputs will build peaks in CF. During this phase of the trial, the model engages in 
a winner-take-all comparison process by boosting the ‘same’ and ‘different’ nodes close to 
threshold (via activation of a ‘gate’ node; see Figure 2). The ‘different’ node receives input from 
CF; the ‘same’ node receives input from WM. Consequently, if the model detects non-matching 
inputs at test, ‘different’ will win the competition; if, however, no or few non-matching inputs 
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are detected, ‘same’ will win the competition due to strong input from WM. It is important to 
point out that the input to the ‘same’ node is effectively normalized by input from the inhibitory 
layer to enable equitable comparisons with the ‘different’ node as the set-size (SS) increases (see 
equation 7 in the supplemental information). That is, as the SS increases, more items will be 
activated in WM, generating more input to the ‘same’ node. This would create a large 
asymmetry between activation in the ‘same’ and ‘different’ systems, making it hard to detect 
differences at high SS. To help compensate for this asymmetry, the Inhib layer also sends 
inhibitory output to the ‘same’ node, effectively balancing the increase in excitation from WM at 
high SS with an increase in inhibition from Inhib (which also increases at high SS).  
Before describing the dynamics of the model in detail, it is useful to first consider the 
following dynamic field equation that defines the neural population dynamics of the CF layer to 
connect to the concepts introduced in the previous section: 
𝜏)?̇?(𝑥, 𝑡) = 	−𝑢(𝑥, 𝑡) + ℎ + 𝑠(𝑥, 𝑡) + : 𝑐;;2𝑥 − 𝑥′3𝑔 5𝑢2𝑥′, 𝑡36𝑑𝑥′
−:𝑐;<2𝑥 − 𝑥′3𝑔 5𝑣2𝑥′, 𝑡36𝑑𝑥′ − 𝑎;<?@ABC@ :𝑔 5𝑣2𝑥′, 𝑡36𝑑𝑥′ 	
+ : 𝑐D2𝑥 − 𝑥′3𝜉2𝑥′, 𝑡3𝑑𝑥′ + 𝑎;E𝑔2𝑑(𝑡)3 − 𝑎;F𝑔2𝑚(𝑡)3												 
Activation, u, in CF evolves over the timescale determined by the τ parameter (see Supplemental 
Information). The first three terms term in Equation 5 are the same as in Equation 4. Next is local 
excitation, ∫ 𝑐;;2𝑥 − 𝑥′3𝑔 5𝑢2𝑥′, 𝑡36𝑑𝑥′, which is defined as the convolution of a Gaussian 
local excitation function, 𝑐;;2𝑥 − 𝑥′3, with the sigmoided output, g(u(x’,t)), from the CF layer. 
CF receives inhibition from an inhibitory layer, v. Lateral inhibitory contributions are specified 
by, −∫𝑐;<2𝑥 − 𝑥′3𝑔 5𝑣2𝑥′, 𝑡36 𝑑𝑥′, which is defined as the convolution of a Gaussian 
(5)	
MODEL-BASED	fMRI		 	 20		
surround inhibition function and the sigmoided output from an inhibitory layer (v). There is also 
a global inhibitory contribution specified by, −𝑎;<_IJKLMJ ∫ 𝑔 5𝑣2𝑥′, 𝑡36𝑑𝑥′, which is applied 
homogenously across the field. These two inhibitory terms give rise to inhibitory troughs that 
surround local excitatory peaks in the contrast layer. The next term specifies spatially correlated 
noise, ∫𝑐D2𝑥 − 𝑥′3𝜉2𝑥′, 𝑡3𝑑𝑥′, which is defined as the convolution of a Gaussian kernel and 
a vector of white noise. This simulates a set of noisy inputs to CF reflecting neural noise 
impinging upon this local neural population. The last two terms specify inputs from the decision 
nodes (see Figure 2). Both of these inputs are modulated by the sigmoidal function (g). The 
‘different’ node (d) globally excites CF, 𝑎;E𝑔2𝑑(𝑡)3, while the same or “match” node (m) 
globally inhibits CF, −𝑎;F𝑔(𝑚(𝑡)). These excitatory and inhibitory inputs help maintain peaks 
in CF if a difference is detected, and help suppress activation in CF if ‘sameness’ is detected (see 
‘crossing’ inhibitory connections between the decision nodes and CF/WM in Figure 2). Note that 
there is no direct input from WM to CF. 
Figure 3 shows an exemplary simulation of a single change detection trail to show how 
activation changes through time as the model encodes items into memory, maintains memory 
representations during a delay, and then detects a difference in a subsequently presented stimulus 
array. Figure 3A shows activation across the feature space in CF and WM through time. Figure 
3B shows the node activations through time. The remaining panels show time slices through CF 
and WM at particular points during the simulation indicated by the boxes in Figure 3A (see also 
downward arrows marking the same time points in Figure 3B). 
At 100 ms into the simulation, 3 colored stimuli (3 Gaussian inputs) are presented to the 
model. Initially, this is associated with large increases in activation in CF; a bit later, peaks build 
in the WM layer (see Figure 3A). As activation builds in WM, activation in CF becomes 
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suppressed. After 600 ms into the simulation, the stimulus array is turned off. Now, activation 
within CF is strongly suppressed (see troughs in Figure 3C). However, activation in WM is 
sustained in the absence of the input throughout the delay period (see Figure 3D) due to strong 
recurrent interactions within this layer. At 1800 ms into the simulation, a second array of stimuli 
is presented to the model. At presentation of the test array, the gate node is activated (Figure 3B); 
this boosts the activation of the ‘same’ and ‘different’ nodes. At the same time, the presentation 
of the novel color (C4) leads to the formation of a new peak in CF (Figure 3E). This peak 
increases the activation of the ‘different’ node and this node goes above threshold (Figure 3B) 
leading to a ‘different’ decision on this trial.  
A key innovation of the DF model is that the model captures what happens on both 
correct and incorrect trials. Figure 4 shows exemplary simulations of instances in which the 
model performs correctly or incorrectly on each trial type in the change detection task. Figure 4A 
shows a correct rejection trial – correctly responding ‘same’ on a ‘same’ trial. Note that we are 
using terminology from the literature on visual change detection here (Cowan, 2001; Pashler, 
1988). A sample array of four colors is presented at the start of the simulation, generating peaks 
in CF. Peaks in CF drive the consolidation of the peaks in the WM field, after which activation 
within CF becomes suppressed. This is shown in the lower left panels of Figure 4A: at the offset 
of the memory array, 4 peaks are being actively maintained in WM while there is a profile of 
inhibitory troughs in CF. During the memory delay, activation is maintained within WM via 
recurrent interactions. When the same four colors are presented at test, no peaks are built in CF 
(see asterisks above CF input locations in Figure 4A). The decision nodes are plotted at the top. 
At the end of the trial, the ‘same’ decision is above threshold indicating the that the model has 
correctly generated a ‘same’ response.  
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Figure 4B shows a simulation of a hit trial – correctly detecting a change on a ‘different’ 
trial. The dynamics during the presentation of the memory array are comparable. In particular, at 
the offset of the memory array, four peaks are being actively maintained in WM, with a profile 
of inhibitory troughs in CF. During the test array, a new item is presented (C5) along with 3 of 
the original inputs (C2-C4); the new input generates a peak in CF at this color value because 
there is not enough inhibition at this site to prevent the peak from emerging (see asterisk above 
CF in Figure 4B). The peak in CF passes strong input to the ‘different’ node such that by the end 
of the trial, the ‘different’ node is above threshold indicating that the model has correctly 
generated a ‘different’ response. 
The bottom two panels in Figure 4 show the model’s performance on error trials. Figure 
4C shows a false alarm trial – incorrectly generating a ‘different’ response on a no change trial. 
False alarms are likely to arise in the model when a peak fails to consolidate in WM. This is 
shown in the lower left panels of Figure 4C: after presentation of the memory array, one peak 
fails to consolidate (fails to go above threshold; see asterisk) and activation at this site returns to 
baseline levels during the delay. Consequently, when the same colors are presented at test, the 
model falsely detects a change (see asterisk above CF in the right column of Figure 4C). In 
contrast to other models (Cowan, 2001; Pashler, 1988), therefore, false alarms reflect a failure of 
consolidation / maintenance rather than a guess.  
A ‘miss’ trial is shown in Figure 4D – incorrectly generating a ‘same’ response on a 
change trial. This simulation shows a typical state of the neural dynamics after presentation of 
the memory array, with four peaks being maintained in WM and an inhibitory profile in CF. 
Note, however, the strong inhibitory suppression on the left side of the feature space as there are 
three WM peaks relatively close together. Consequently, when a different color is presented in 
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that region of feature space, a weak activation bump is generated in CF (see asterisk above CF in 
Figure 4D). This bump is too weak to drive a ‘different’ response and the ‘same’ node wins the 
decision-making competition (see top panel in Figure 4D). Thus, in contrast to assumptions of 
other models (Cowan, 2001; Pashler, 1988), comparison is not a perfect process in the DF 
model; misses occur even when all items are remembered. This aspect of the DF model is 
consistent with more recent work illustrating how comparison errors can impact performance on 
WM tasks (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; Awh, Barton, & Vogel, 2007). 
Note that errors in the DF model are impacted by stochastic noise in the equations--a 
realistic source of neural noise that is evident in actual neural systems. These fluctuations are 
amplified by local excitatory / inhibitory neural interactions and can influence the macroscopic 
patterns -- peaks in the model -- that impact different behavioral outcomes such as 'same' and 
'different' decisions. Notice, for instance, that the inputs across all four panels in Figure 4 are 
identical; the parameters of the model are identical as well. Thus, the only thing that differs is 
how the activation dyanmics unfold through time in the context of neural noise. Of course, noise 
is not the only factor that influences whether the model makes an error. The number of inputs 
plays a large role as does the metric similarity of the items. With more peaks to maintain, there is 
more competition among peaks as well as more global inhibition. Consequently, the likelihood 
of a false alarm increases because neighboring peaks might fail to consolidate in WM. At the 
same time, with more peaks in WM, there is also a greater overall suppression of CF and 
stronger input to the ‘same’ node. Consequently, the likelihood of a miss increases as well.  
Are there unique neural signatures of the processes illustrated in Figure 4? If so, that 
would provide a way to test our account of the origin of errors in change detection. To examine 
this question here, we used an integrative cognitive neuroscience approach initially developed in 
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Buss et al. (2014) and Wijeakumar et al. (2016). We describe this approach next.  
Turning neural population activation in DFT into hemodynamic predictions  
 In this section, we describe a linking hypothesis derived from the model-based fMRI 
literature that directly links neural dynamics in DFT to hemodynamics that can be measured with 
fMRI. This requires consideration of multiple factors, including what is measured by fMRI both 
in terms of hemodynamics and spatially in patterns of BOLD within voxels through time. Here, 
we make several simplifying assumptions which we discuss. The end product is a direct link—
millisecond by millisecond—between neural activation in the DF model and fMRI measures 
through time as well as to behavioral decisions on each trial. Although the timescale of fMRI 
does not allow for millisecond precision, the model is specified at that fine-grained timescale 
and, therefore, could be mapped to other technologies such as ERP in future work (we return to 
this issue in the General Discussion). Critically, this approach extends beyond previous model-
based approaches (Ashby & Waldschmidt, 2008; O’Doherty, Dayan, Friston, Critchley, & 
Dolan, 2003). Specifically, this approach specifies mechanisms that directly give rise to 
behavioral and neural responses; consequently, any modifications to these mechanisms directly 
impact the resultant behavioral and neural resposnes predicted by the model. To illustrate, we 
contrast our approach with model-based fMRI examples using the adaptive control of thought - 
rational (ACT-R) framework. We conclude that the DF-based approach is an example of an 
integrative cognitive neuroscience approach to fMRI (Turner et al., 2016).  
Our approach builds from the biophysiological literature examining the basis of the 
neural blood flow response. Logothetis and colleagues (2001) demonstrated that the local-field 
potential (LFP), a measure of dendritic activity within a population of neurons, is temporally 
correlated with the blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) signal. Furthermore, the BOLD 
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response can be reconstructed by convolving the LFP with an impulse response function which 
specifies the time course of the blood flow response to the underlying neural activity. Deco and 
colleagues followed up on this work using an integrate-and-fire neural network to demonstrated 
that an LFP can be simulated by summing the absolute value of all of the forces that contribute to 
the rate of change in activation of the neural units (Deco et al., 2004). Attempts to simulate fMRI 
data using this approach were equivocal—some hemodynamic patterns produced by the network 
did qualitatively mimic fMRI data measured in experiment; however, no efforts were made to 
quantitatively evaluate the fit of the spiking network model to either the behavioral or fMRI data. 
Here, we adapt this approach to construct an LFP signal for each component of the DF 
model. To describe how we transform the real-time neural activation in the model into a neural 
prediction that can be measured with fMRI, re-consider the equation that defines the neural 
population dynamics of the CF layer (reproduced here for convenience): 
𝜏)?̇?(𝑥, 𝑡) = 	−𝑢(𝑥, 𝑡) + ℎ + 𝑠(𝑥, 𝑡) + :𝑐;;2𝑥 − 𝑥′3𝑔 5𝑢2𝑥′, 𝑡36 𝑑𝑥′
−:𝑐;<2𝑥 − 𝑥′3𝑔 5𝑣2𝑥′, 𝑡36 𝑑𝑥′ − 𝑎;<?@ABC@ :𝑔 5𝑣2𝑥′, 𝑡36𝑑𝑥′ 	
+ :𝑐D2𝑥 − 𝑥′3𝜉2𝑥′, 𝑡3𝑑𝑥′ + 𝑎;E𝑔2𝑑(𝑡)3 − 𝑎;F𝑔2𝑚(𝑡)3												 
 To simulate hemodynamics, we transformed this equation into an LFP equation that we 
could track in real time (millisecond by millisecond) for each component of the model (see 
Equations 9-14 in Supplemental Information). This time-course was then convolved with an 
impulse response function to give rise to hemodynamic predictions that could be compared to 
BOLD data. To illustrate, equation 7 specifies the LFP for the contrast field: we summed the 
absolute value of all terms contributing to the rate of change in activation within the field, 
excluding the stability term, -u(x,t), and the neuronal resting level, h. We also excluded the 
(6)	
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stimulus input, s(x,t), because we applied inputs directly to the model rather than implementing 
these in a more neurally realistic manner (e.g., by using simulated input fields as in Lipinski et 
al., 2012). The resulting LFP equation was as follows:  
𝑢NOP(𝑡) = |∬𝑐;;2𝑥 − 𝑥′3𝑔 5𝑢2𝑥′, 𝑡36 𝑑𝑥	𝑑𝑥′ |𝜂
+ |∬𝑐;<2𝑥 − 𝑥′3𝑔 5𝑣2𝑥′, 𝑡36𝑑𝑥	𝑑𝑥′) |𝜂 + T𝑎;<?@ABC@ :𝑔 5𝑣2𝑥′, 𝑡36𝑑𝑥′T
+ |∬𝑐D2𝑥 − 𝑥′3𝜉2𝑥′, 𝑡3𝑑𝑥	𝑑𝑥′ |𝜂 + U𝑎;E𝑔2𝑑(𝑡)3U+ U𝑎;F𝑔2𝑚(𝑡)3U																																																																																																												 
It is important to note several simplifying assumptions here. First, neural activity in the 
CF field was aggregated into a single LFP (representing a single neural region). We consider this 
a starting point for explorations of this model-based fMRI approach. An alternative would be to 
use several basis functions to sample different parts of the field and then explore the mapping of 
these localized LFPs to voxel-based patterns in the brain. Later in the paper, we quantitatively 
map hemodynamic predictions from the DF model to BOLD signals measured from 1cm3 
spheres centered at regions of interest from a meta-analysis of the fMRI VWM literature 
(Wijeakumar, Spencer, Bohache, Boas, & Magnotta, 2015). At this resolution (1cm3), slight 
variations in hemodynamics due to which part of the field we are sampling from probably make 
little difference. By contrast, if we were studying population dynamics in visual cortex with a 7T 
scanner in different laminar layers, the use of basis functions to sample the field would be an 
interesting alternative to explore. 
Similarly, in equation 7 we normalized each contribution to the LFP by dividing by the 
number of units in that contribution, either by 1 (e.g., for the ‘same’ node) or by η, the field size. 
(7)	
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This way, contributions to the CF LFP from, say, the different node were of comparable 
magnitude to contributions from local excitatory interactions. Again, this is a simplifying 
assumption that can be explored in future work. For instance, there is an emerging literature 
examining how excitatory versus inhibitory neural interactions differentially contribute to the 
BOLD signal (Lee et al., 2010). It would be possible to differentially weight these types of 
contributions to the LFP in future work as clarity emerges on this front. In the simulations 
reported below, we down-weighted all inhibitory LFP components by a factor of 0.2. 
 Once an LFP has been calculated from each component of the DF model – one LFP for 
CF, one for WM, one for ‘different’, and one for ‘same’ – a hemodynamic response can then be 
calculated by convolving 𝑢NOP with an impulse response function that specifies the time-course 
of the slow blood-flow response to neural activation (see Equation 15 in the Supplemental 
Information). The simulated hemodynamic time course for each component was computed as a 
percent signal change relative to the maximum intensity across the run. Average responses for 
each trial-type within each component were then computed within the relevant time window (14s 
for the simulations of the Todd & Marois data and 20s for the Magen et al. data) as the amount 
of change relative to the onset of the trial (see Supplemental Information for full details). A 
group average for each trial type was then computed across the group of runs. 
Figure 5 shows an exemplary simulation of the model for a series of 8 trials with a 
memory load -- or set size (SS) -- of 2 items for the first two trials and 4 items for the subsequent 
six trials. Panels A-C show neural activation of the decision nodes and associated LFPs / 
hemodynamic predictions through time. In particular, panel C shows the activation of the 
decision and gate nodes, highlighting the evolution of decisions that reflect the overt behavior of 
the model. Going from left to right, the model makes 8 decisions in sequence (see labels at the 
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bottom of the figure): (1) “different” (correct), (2) “same” (correct), (3) “different” (correct), (4) 
“different” (incorrect), (5) “same” (incorrect), (6) “same” (correct), (7) “different” (correct), and 
(8) “same” (correct). Note that the long delays in-between trials accurately reflects the typical 
delays between trials in a neuroimaging experiment. We have fixed this time interval here to 
make it easier to see the hemodynamic response associated with each trial (which is delayed by 
several seconds reflecting the slow hemodynamic response); critically, however, we can match 
these inter-trial intervals precisely to reflect the actual timings used in experiment. 
Panels A and B in Figure 5 show the LFP and hemodynamic responses for the ‘same’ and 
‘different’ nodes, respecitvely. In general, the decision node hemodynamics are strongly 
influenced by the inhibition at test evident in the winner-take-all competition. For instance, the 
first trial is a ‘different’ (correct) trial. Here, the ‘different’ node wins the competition, but notice 
that the ‘same’ (Figure 5A) hemodynamic response is stronger than the ‘different’ hemodynamic 
response (Figure 5B); even though ‘different’ wins the competition with strong excitatory 
activation, the ‘same’ hemodynamic response is stronger due to the inhibitory input to this node. 
This is counterintuitive – the node with the stronger hemodynamic response is actually the one 
that loses the competition. We test this prediction using fMRI later in the paper. 
Note that it is possible we could reverse the counterintuitive decision-node prediction in 
the model in two ways. First, the magnitude of the inhibitory contribution to the decision node 
dynamics could be reduced via parameter tuning. This would be tricky to achieve, however, 
because the decision system dynamics have to balance ‘just right’ such that the full pattern of 
behavioral data are correctly modeled. If, for instance, inhibition is too weak, the model might 
respond ‘same’ at high memory loads simply because there are so many peaks in WM and, 
therefore, strong input to the ‘same’ node at test. Thus, there are strong constraints in model 
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parameters – if we try to ‘tune’ the neural / hemodynamic predictions so they make more 
intuitive sense, the model might no longer accurately fit the behavioral data. 
That said, there is a second way we could modify the hemodynamic predictions of the 
decision nodes more directly, making them less dominated by inhibition: we could down-weight 
the inhibitory contributions within the LFP equation itself. Doing so would be more akin to a 
‘two-stage’ approach as outlined by Turner et al. (2016) in which separate parameters are used to 
generate behavioral responses and neural responses. However, by doing so we could implement 
the hypothesis that inhibitory contributions to LFPs are weaker than excitatory contributions, a 
hypothesis that could be explored using optogenetics (e.g., Lee et al., 2010). To do this, we could 
add a new inhibitory weighting parameter to equation 7 to reduce the strength of the inhibitory 
contributions (i.e., the second, third, and sixth terms in the equation). Note that this would have 
to be applied to all inhibitiory terms in the full model; consequently, inhibition would have less 
of an effect on the decision-node hemodynamics, but it would also have less of an effect on the 
CF and WM hemodynamics as well. We explore this sense of parameter tuning in the first 
simulation experiment. 
Panels E and G in Figure 5 show the activation of CF and WM, respectively. Note that all 
of the activation dynamics highlighted in the field activities in Figure 3A still occur here; 
however, these dynamics are compressed in time as we are showing a sequence of 8 trials with 
relatively long inter-trial intervals. That said, on each trial, the sequence of stimulus 
presentations is evident in CF at the start and end of each trial (see peaks at the onset and offset 
of each inhibitory period in Figure 5E), while the active maintenance of peaks in WM is also 
readily apparent (Figure 5G).  
Panels D and F in Figure 5 show the LFP and hemodynamic predictions for CF and WM. 
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CF is influenced by whether the trial is ‘same’ or ‘different’, with a slightly stronger response in 
CF on ‘different’ trials (see, for instance, the large first and third hemodynamic peaks; we show 
this more clearly later in the paper when we aggregate LFPs across many simulation trials versus 
the individual simulations as shown here). WM is most strongly influenced by how many items 
are maintained during the delay; thus, this layer shows relatively weaker responses on the first 
two trials when the memory load is 2 items compared to the subsequent trials when the memory 
load is 4 items. 
In summary, Figure 5 illustrates over a series of trials how the model generates a complex 
pattern of predictions associated with the neural processes that undelie encoding and 
consolidation of items in WM, the maintenanace of those items during the memory delay, and 
decision-making and comparison processes at test. Importantly, LFPs and hemodyanmic 
responses are extracted from the same patterns of neural activation that drive neural function and 
behavioral responses on each trial. In this way, distinct neural dynamics are engaged across 
components of the model as different types of decisions unfold in the context of the change 
detection task and these directly lead to hemodynamic predictions. The distinctive nature of these 
simulated neural responses is important for being able to use the model to shed light on the 
functional role of different brain regions in VWM. For instance, if we find a good 
correspondence between model hemodynamics and hemodynamics measured with fMRI, this 
uniqueness gives us confidence that we can infer different functions are being carried out by 
those brain regions. 
Comparisons with other model-based fMRI approaches 
Beyond the literature on VWM, other model-based approaches to fMRI analysis have 
been implemented that bridge the gap between brain and behavior (see Turner et al. 2017 for an 
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excellent summary and classification of different approaches). In our previous paper exploring a 
model-based fMRI approach using DFT (Buss et al., 2014), we compared the DFT approach to 
the model-based fMRI approach using ACT-R. Comparing these approaches is a useful starting 
point as there are similarities in the broader goals of DFT and ACT-R. 
Anderson and colleagues have developed a technique for simulating fMRI data with the 
ACT-R framework (Anderson, Albert, & Fincham, 2005; Anderson et al., 2008; Anderson, Qin, 
Sohn, Stenger, & Carter, 2003; Borst & Anderson, 2013; Borst, Nijboer, Taatgen, van Rijn, & 
Anderson, 2015; Qin et al., 2003). ACT-R is a production system model that explains behavioral 
data based on the duration of engagement of processing modules and differential engagement of 
these modules across conditions. Specifically, ACT-R models posit a cognitive architecture 
consisting of separate modules that are recruited sequentially in a task. This generates a 
‘demand’ function for each module through time – a time course of 0s and 1s with 1s being 
generated when a module is active. The ‘demand’ function can then be convolved with an HRF 
for each module to generate a predicted BOLD signal for each component of the architecture. 
The predicted hemodynamic pattern can then be compared against brain activity measured with 
fMRI in specific brain regions to determine the correspondence between modules in the model 
and brain regions. 
This approach is similar to the DFT-based approach used here. Both ACT-R and DFT 
build architectures to realize particular cognitive functions. Both measure activation through time 
for each part of the larger architecture. These activation signals are then convolved with an 
impulse response function to generate predicted BOLD signals for each component. By 
comparing these predicted signals to fMRI data, the components can be mapped to brain regions 
and function can be inferred from this mapping. This can be done by qualitatively comparing 
MODEL-BASED	fMRI		 	 32		
properties of the predicted brain response through time to measured HRFs (e.g., Buss et al., 
2014; Fincham, Carter, van Veen, Stenger, & Anderson, 2002). We adopt this approach in the 
first simulation experiment here. Model-predicted data can also be quantitatively compared to 
measured fMRI data using a general linear modeling approach (e.g., Anderson et al., 2007). We 
adopt this approach in the subsequent simulation experiment.  
In the review of model-based fMRI approaches by Turner and colleageus (Turner et al., 
2016), they used the ACT-R approach as an example of integrative cognitive neuroscience 
(ICN). Recall that the goal of ICN is to develop a single model capable of predicting both neural 
and behavioral measures. Formally, ICN approaches use a single model with a single set of 
parameters, θ, that jointly explain both neural and behavioral data. Consequently, such models 
must make a moment-by-moment prediction of neural data, and a trial-by-trial prediction of the 
behavioral data. One can see why ACT-R might be a good example of ICN: the model specifies 
the activation of each module in real time, and this activation affects the model’s neural 
predictions because it changes the ‘demand’ function (the vector of 0s and 1s through time). 
Differences in activation also affect behavior, for instance, modulating reaction times. 
Given the similarities between ACT-R and DFT, we can ask if DFT rises to the level of 
ICN as well. Like with ACT-R, DFT proposes a specific integration of brain and behavior. In 
particular, there are not separate neural vs. behavioral parameters; rather, there is one set of 
parameters in the neural model and changes in these parameters have direct consequences for 
both neural activity – the LFPs generated for each component – and for the behavioral decisions 
of the model – whether the ‘same’ or ‘different’ node enter the ‘on’ state and when in time this 
decision is made (yielding a reaction time for the model). 
These examples highlight that in DFT, brain and behavior do not live at different levels. 
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Instead, there is one level – the level of neural population dynamics. This level generates neural 
patterns through time on a millisecond timescale. This level also generates macroscopic 
decisions on every trial via the neural population activity of the ‘same’ and ‘different’ nodes. 
When one of these nodes enters the ‘on’ attractor state at the end of each trial, a behavioral 
decision is made. In this sense, we contend that DFT – like ACT-R – is an example of an ICN 
approach.  
Given the many similarities in these two approaches to model-based fMRI, we can ask 
the next question: are there key differences? The most substantive difference is in how the two 
frameworks conceptualize ‘activation’ and, relatedly, how they implement processes through 
time. As demonstrated in Figures 3-5, the activation patterns measured in each neural population 
in the DF model are more than just an index of the engagement of the population; rather, 
activation has meaning—it represents the colors presented in the task. This was emphasized in 
our introduction to DFT. Although ‘activation’ and, in particular, the neural dynamics that 
govern activation, are key concepts in DFT, we moved beyond the level of activation to think 
about what activation represents by modelling activation in a neural field distributed over a 
feature dimension. 
Critically, by grounding activation in a specific feature space we also had to specify the 
neural processes through time that do the job of consolidating features in WM, maintaining those 
features through time, and then comparing the features in WM with the features in the test array. 
Thus, our model not only specifies what activation means; it also specifies the neural processes 
that underlie behavior, that is, the neural processes that give rise to the macroscopic neural 
patterns that underlie same/different decisions on each trial. Importantly, the details of this neural 
implementation have consequences for the activation patterns produced by the model. If we, for 
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instance, changed how encoding and consolidation were done by adding new layers to the model 
to separate visual encoding from shifts of attention to each item (Schneegans, Spencer, & 
Schöner, 2016), the model would generate different activation patterns through time and, 
consequently, different hemodynamic predictions. 
By contrast, activation in ACT-R is abstract. Each module takes a specific amount of 
time which creates differences in the ‘demand’ or ‘activation’ function, but the modules in ACT-
R typically do not actually implement anything; rather, they instantiate how long the process 
would take if it were to implement a particular function. Sometimes modules are actually 
implemented (Jilk, Lebiere, O’Reilly, & Anderson, 2008), but this has not been done with any 
fMRI examples.  
Is this difference in how ‘activation’ is conceptualized important? To evaluate this 
question, consider a recent model of VWM using ACT-R (Veksler et al., 2017). At face value, 
this model sets up an ideal contrast—in theory, we could contrast the model-based fMRI 
prediction of our DF model with model-based fMRI predictions derived from the Veksler et al. 
ACT-R model. To explain why we cannot do this, it is useful to first describe the Veksler et al. 
model. 
The Veksler et al. model uses the ACT-R memory equation to implement a variant of 
VWM. Each item in the display is associated with an activation level in the memory module that 
is a function of whether it was fixated/encoded, how recently it was fixated/encoded, a decay 
rate, a base-level offset for activation, and logistically distributed noise with a mean of 0 and a 
specific SD. To place this model in the context of change detection, we must first make some 
decisions about how encoding works. For instance, in many change detection experiments, 
fixation is held constant, so we could assume that a specific number of items start off at a 
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baseline activation level. We could also hypothesize that each item takes a certain amount of 
time to encode and then let the model encode as many items as it can in the time allowed.  
After encoding, the next key issue is which items are still remembered after the delay 
when memory is tested. Concretely, the memory module specifies an activation value of each 
item through time. If that activation value is above a threshold when memory is tested, that item 
is remembered. If the activation is below threshold at test, that item is forgotten.  
The challenging question is what to do in this model at test. Each item is only represented 
by an activation level—there is no content. Consequently, it’s not clear how to do comparison. 
One idea is to assume that comparison is a perfect process. This is similar to assumptions in the 
original models of VWM by Pashler (1988) and Cowan (2001). Thus, if an item is remembered, 
we always get a correct response. If an item is forgotten, then we could just have the model 
randomly guess. Sometimes the model will generate a lucky guess. Other times the model will 
guess incorrectly, generating a false alarm or a miss.  
Although this approach sounds reasonable, it does not actually do a good job modelling 
behavior because performance varies as a function of whether the test array is the ‘same’ or 
‘different’. In particular, adults are typically more accurate on ‘same’ trials than ‘different’ trials 
(Luck & Vogel, 1997); interestingly, children and aging adults show this effect more 
dramatically (Costello & Buss, 2018; Simmering, 2016; Wijeakumar, Magnotta, & Spencer, 
2017). If the model has a perfect comparison process, it’s not clear how to account for such 
differences unless one simply builds in a bias in the guessing rate with more ‘same’ guesses than 
‘different’ guesses. More importantly, this approach to comparison does not generate any 
predictions about the activation level on ‘guess’ trials when an item is forgotten because the 
underlying demand function would be the same on all guess trials. This doesn’t match empirical 
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data because we know that fMRI data vary on ‘correct’ vs. ‘incorrect’ trials, as well as on false 
alarms vs. misses (Pessoa & Ungerleider, 2004). 
In sum, when we try to implement change detection in the ACT-R VWM model, we run 
into a host of questions with no clear solutions. Critically, many of these questions are centered 
on the main contrast with DFT that, in ACT-R, there is ‘activation’ but no details about what 
activation represents.  This example also highlights how important the comparison process is to 
predicting neural activation. On this front, we re-emphasize that to our knowledge, DFT is the 
only model of VWM that specifies a mechanism for how comparison is done. This observation 
will have consequences below—although there are many models of VWM, because none of 
them specify how comparison is done this means that no other models make hemodynamic 
predictions that we can contrast with DFT where comparison is part of the unfolding 
hemodynamic response. Instead, we opt for a different model-testing strategy by contrasting DFT 
with a standard statistical model.  
Simulations of Todd & Marois (2004) and Magen et al. (2009) 
The goal of this paper is to examine whether DFT is a useful bridge theory, 
simultaneously capturing both neural and behavioral data to directly address the neural 
mechanisms that underlie cognitive processes (Buss & Spencer, 2018; Buss et al., 2014; 
Wijeakumar et al., 2016). Here we ask whether the model can simulate two findings from the 
fMRI literature that describe different relationships between intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and VWM 
performance. One set of data show that neural activation as measured by BOLD asymptotes as 
people reach the putative limit of working memory capacity. In particular, Todd and Marois 
(2004) reported that the BOLD signal in the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) increases as more items 
must be remembered with an asymptote near the capacity of VWM. This suggests that the IPS 
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plays a direct role in VWM. This basic effect has been reported in multiple other studies as well 
(Todd & Marois, 2004; Xu & Chun, 2006; for related ideas using EEG, see Vogel & Machizawa, 
2004). In contrast, a second set of results shows that the BOLD response in the IPS does not 
asymptote when the memory delay is increased in duration (Magen, Emmanouil, McMains, 
Kastner, & Treisman, 2009). From this observation, Magen and colleagues proposed that the 
posterior parietal cortex is more involved with the rehearsal or attentional processes that mediate 
VWM, rather than being the site of VWM directly. Here we ask if the DF model can shed light 
on these differing brain-behavior relationships, explaining the seemingly contradictory set of 
results.  
These initial simulations serve two functions. First, they provide an initial exploration of 
whether the LFP-based linking hypothesis generates hemodynamics from the DF model that are 
qualitatively similar to measured BOLD responses. This is a non-trivial step because simulating 
both brain and behavior requires integrating the neural processes that underlie encoding, 
consolidation, maintenance, and comparison. The present experiment explores whether we get 
this integration approximately right. Second, this experiment serves to fix parameters of the DF 
model. Specifically, we allowed for some parameter modification here as we attempted to fit 
behavioral data from Todd and Marois (2004). We then fixed the model parameters when 
simulating data from Magen et al (2009) as well as in a subsequent experiment where we 
generated novel, a priori neural predictions that could be tested with fMRI.  
Methods 
Simulations were conducted in Matlab 7.5.0 (Mathworks, Inc.) on a PC with an Intel® i7 
3.33 GHz quad-core processor (the Matlab code is available at www.dynamicfieldtheory.org). 
For the purposes of mapping model dynamics to real-time, 1 time-step in the model was equal to 
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2 ms. For instance, to mimic the experimental paradigm of Todd and Marois (2004), the model 
was given a set of Gaussian inputs (e.g., 3 colors = 3 Gaussian inputs centered over different hue 
values) corresponding to the sample array for a duration of 75 time-steps (150 ms). This was 
followed by a delay of 600 time-steps (1200 ms) during which no inputs were presented. Finally, 
the test item was presented for 900 time-steps (1800 ms). For the simulation of the Magen et al. 
(2009) task (Experiment 3), the sample array was presented for 250 time-steps (500 ms), 
followed by a delay of 3000 time-steps (6000 ms) and a test array that was presented for 1200 
time-steps (2400 ms). For both simulations, the response of the model was determined based on 
which decision node became stably activated during the test array (see Figures 3-5). Recall that 
the local-excitation/lateral-inhibition operating on the decision nodes gives rise to a winner-take-
all dynamics that generates a single active (i.e., above 0) decision node at the end of every trial.  
 The central question here was whether the neural patterns generated by the model 
mimic the differing BOLD signatures reported by Todd and Marois (2004) and Magen et al. 
(2009). To examine this question, we first used the model to simulate the behavioral data from 
Todd and Marois (2004). We initialized the model using the parameters from Johnson et al. 
(2009a), then modified parameters iteratively until the model provided a good quantitative fit to 
the behavioral patterns from Todd and Marois (2004). For example, the resting level of the CF 
component had to be increased to accommodate for the shorter duration of the memory array in 
the Todd and Marois study. To compensate for the increased excitability of this component, we 
also had to reduce the strength of its self-excitation (see Appendix for full set of parameters and 
differences from the Johnson et al. 2009a model). We implemented the model to match the 
number of participants from the target studies to facilitate statistical comparison of the datasets. 
Specifically, we simulated the model 17 times in the Todd and Marois (2004) task to match the 
MODEL-BASED	fMRI		 	 39		
17 participants in this study, and 12 times in the Magen et al. (2009) task to match the 12 
participants in their study. We adminstered 60 same and 60 different trials at each set size for 
each simulation run. Group data were then computed to compare with group data from these 
studies.Once the model provided a good fit to the Todd and Marois (2004) behavioral data, we 
then assessed whether components of the model produced the asymptote in the IPS 
hemodynamic response observed in the original report. This was indeed the case. These model 
parameters were then used to simulate data from Magen at al. (2009) as well as in the subsequent 
fMRI experiment to test novel predictions of the model. 
Results 
As shown in Figure 6A, the model captured the behavioral data from Todd and Marois 
(2004) well overall with RMSE = 0.063. It is important to note that the model was able to 
reproduce these data even though there were many differences in the behavioral task between 
this study and the study by Johnson et al (2009a) that was used to generate the model. The 
duration of the memory array was shorter in the Todd and Marois task (100ms compared to 
500ms in Johnson et al.) and the memory delay was longer (1,200 ms compared to 1,000 ms in 
Johnson et al.). To highlight these differences, Table 1 summarizes the different versions of the 
change detection task that have been previously modeled using DFT. 
Critically, the model showed a pattern of differences between activation over SS that 
reproduced the asymptote effect in CF (shown in panel B of Figure 6 along with fMRI data from 
IPS from Todd & Marios, 2004). Thus, the CF component replicated the pattern of activation 
reported by Todd and Marois from IPS. Comparing SS1-4 with each other, there was a 
significant increase in the average time course of the hemodynamic response for the contrast 
layer as SS increased (all p<.01). As reported by Todd and Marois (2004), there was not a 
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significant difference in the hemodynamic time course between SS4 and SS6 (t(16)= 0.1187, 
p=.907) or SS4 and SS8 (t(16)= 0.5188, p=.611). These data show a good correspondence 
between the neural dynamics from CF and the measured hemodynamic responses of IPS. 
To examine whether the asymptotic effect was unique to CF, we examined the 
hemodynamic patterns produced by the other model components (Figure 6C). The ‘same’ node 
also produced evidence of an asymptote in the simulated hemodynamic response (comparing 
SS1 through SS4: p < .001; SS4 v SS6: t(16)= 0.2589, p= .799). However, a decrease in 
activation was observed between SS4 and SS8 (t(16)= -7.927, p< .001). The WM field and the 
‘different’ node did not produce a statistical asymptote in activation. The WM field showed a 
systematic increase in the HDR over set sizes (all t(16) >16.1290, p< .001). The ‘different’ node 
showed a decrease in activation from SS1 to SS4 (t(16)>3.8783, p<.002), a trending difference 
between SS4 and SS6 (t(16) = 2.024, p= .06), and an increase in activation between SS6 and SS8 
(t(16)= 7.3788, p< .001). These results illustrate that different components of the model can yield 
distinct patterns of hemodynamics based on how these components are activated over the course 
of a task.   
We next examined whether the same model with the same parameters could also simulate 
behavioral and IPS data from Experiment 3 in Magen et al. (2009). Simulation results this task 
are shown in Figure 7. As can be seen, the model approximated the behavioral data well (now 
presented as capacity, Cowan’s K, instead of percent correct) with an overall RMSE = 0.477 
(Figure 7A). The hemodynamic data from the model did not show a double-humped pattern; 
however, none of the model components showed an asymptote in this long-delay paradigm, 
consistent with the steady increase in activation evident in data from posterior parietal cortex 
from Magen et al. (2009). In particular, activation increased across set sizes for the CF, WM, and 
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‘same’ node components (all t(11)> 3.031, p<.02). The hemodynamic response produced by the 
‘different’ node decreased in amplitude between SS1 and SS3 (t(11)= -10.817, p< .001) and from 
SS3 to SS5 (t(11)= -5.6792, p< .001). The amplitude of the hemodynamic response did not differ 
between SS5 and SS7 (t(11)= 0.006, p= .995). 
Discussion 
These results represent an important step in model-based approaches to fMRI. To our 
knowledge, this is the first demonstration of a fit to both behavioral and fMRI data from a neural 
process model in a working memory task. Simultaneously integrating behavioral and neural data 
within a neurocomputational model is an important achievement (Turner et al., 2016). This 
points to the utility of DFT as a bridge theory in psychology and neuroscience.  
The DF model is also the first neural process model to quantitatively reproduce the 
asymptotic pattern from IPS reported by Todd and Marois (2004). Interestingly, the asymptote in 
the HDR was observed most robustly in the CF component. The asymptote in CF was due to the 
dynamics that give rise to the inhibitory filter within this field. As more items are added to the 
WM field, each item carries weaker activation due to the buildup of lateral inhibition. 
Consequently, less inhibition is passed from the Inhib layer to CF as the set size increases. An 
asymptote was also partially observed in the ‘same’ node. In this case, the asymptote was due to 
the effect of inhibition weakening the average synaptic output per peak within the WM field.  
Interestingly, the hemodynamics within the WM field grew at each increase in set-size 
due to the combined influence of inhibitory and excitatory synaptic activity. Strictly speaking, 
the model does have a carrying capacity in terms of the number of peaks that can be 
simultaneously maintained (Spencer, Perone, & Johnson, 2009). The model is capacity-limited 
for two reasons. First, there are crowding effects: each new color peak that is added to the field 
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has an inhibitory surround that can suppress the activation of metrically similar color values (see, 
Franconeri et al., 2010). Second, each peak increases the amount of global inhibition across the 
field; consequently, it becomes harder to build new peaks at high set sizes (for detailed 
discussion, see Spencer et al., 2009). Importantly, however, there is not a direct correspondence 
in the model between the number of peaks that it can maintain and the capacity estimated by its 
performance, that is, the maximum number of peaks in WM is not the same as capacity estimated 
by K (see Johnson et al., 2014). In this sense, the continued increase in WM-related activation 
across set sizes evident in Figure 6 simply reflects that the model has not yet hit its neural 
capacity limit. 
This set of results challenges prior interpretations of neural activation in VWM. That is, a 
hypothesized signature of working memory – the asymptote in the BOLD signal at high working 
memory loads – is not directly reflected in cortical fields that serve a working memory function; 
rather, this effect is reflected in cortical fields directly coupled to working memory (CF and the 
‘same’ node in the case of the DF model) via the shared inhibitory layer. More concretely, the 
primary synaptic output impinging upon CF is the inhibitory projection from Inhib. As peaks are 
added to WM, activation saturates in this field as does the amount of activation within the 
inhibitory layer. Thus, the asymptotic effect is a signature of neural populations coupled to WM 
systems rather than the site of WM itself. 
Multiple empirical papers have reported evidence of an asymptote in IPS in VWM tasks, 
some using fMRI (Ambrose, Wijeakumar, Buss, & Spencer, 2016; Magen et al., 2009; Todd & 
Marois, 2004, 2005; Xu, 2007; Xu & Chun, 2006) and some using EEG (Sheremata, Bettencourt, 
& Somers, 2010; Vogel & Machizawa, 2004). Although the asymptote effect is consistent, there 
is variability in the details of the asymptote effect across studies and associated neural indices. 
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Several papers have reported that the asymptote effect varies systematically with individual 
differences in behavioral estimates of capacity (see Todd et al., 2005). For instance, Vogel and 
Machizawa (2004) showed that increases in the contralateral delay amplitude in parietal cortex 
from a memory load of 2 to 4 items correlates with individual differences in capacity measured 
with Cowan’s K. Other studies, however, have not replicated this link to individual differences. 
Xu and Chun (2006) found correlations between K and increases in brain activity in IPS for 
simple features, but no significant correlation for complex features. Magen et al. (2009) reported 
a divergence between behavioral estimates of capacity and brain activity in IPS. Similarly, 
Ambrose et al. (2016) found no robust correlations between behavioral estimates of capacity and 
brain activity across manipulations of colors and shapes.  
Other studies have used the asymptote effect to investigate the type of information stored 
in IPS. Xu (2007) reported that IPS activation varies with the total amount of featural 
information people must remember. Xu and Chen (2006) modified this conclusion, suggesting 
that superior IPS activity varies with featural complexity while inferior IPS activity varies with 
the number of objects that must be remembered. Variation with featural complexity was also 
reported by Ambrose et al. (2016), but this effect extended to multiple areas including ventral 
occipital cortex and occipital cortex. More recently, data from Sheremata et al. (2010) suggest 
that left IPS remembers contralateral items, but right IPS contains two populations, one for 
spatial indexing of the contralateral visual field and another involved in nonspatial memory 
processing. 
Critically, all of these studies adopt the same perspective – that the asymptote effect 
points towards a role for IPS in memory maintenance. We found one exception to this view:  
Magen et al. (2009) suggest that IPS activity may reflect the attentional demands of rehearsal 
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rather than capacity limitations per se as activation increases above capacity in some conditions. 
The perspective offered by the DF model may be most in line with Magen et al. (2009) in that 
our findings suggest IPS does not play a central role in maintenance but rather comparison.  
Critically, we showed that the same model could reproduce the pattern of hemodynamic 
responses reported by both Todd and Marois (2004) and Magen et al. (2009). In particular, the 
model showed an asymptote in the Todd and Marois short-delay paradigm as well as the absence 
of a asymptote in the Magen et al. long-delay paradigm. Why are there these differences? In 
large part, this comes down to the relative coarseness of the hemodynamic response. In the short-
delay paradigm, activation differences in CF at high set sizes are relatively short-lived and, 
therefore, fail to have a big impact on the slow hemodynamic response. In the long delay 
condition, by contrast, activation differences in CF at high set sizes extend across the entire 
delay; consequently, these differences are reflected even in the slow hemodynamic response.  
Although the DF model did a good job capturing the magnitude of the hemodynamic 
response in IPS, simulations of data from Magen et al. (2009) failed to capture the shape of the 
hemodynamic response – the double-humped hemodynamic response that has been observed 
across multiple studies (Todd, Han, Harrison, & Marois, 2011; Xu & Chun, 2006). We examined 
this issue in a series of exploratory simulations and found that the details of the HDR played a 
role in the non-optimal fit. In particular, if we re-run our simulations with a narrower HDR that 
starts later and lasts for less time (see blue line in Supplemental Figure 1A),  we still effectively 
simulate IPS data from both studies and see more of a double-humped hemodynamic response 
for simulations of data from Magen et al. (with ‘humps’ at the right points in time). That said, we 
were not able to show the dramatic dip in CF hemodynamics around 12s that is evident in the 
data. We suspect that this could be achieved by down-weighting the inhibitory contributions to 
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the LFP more strongly. This highlights a key direction for future work that adopts a two-stage 
approach to optimizing DF models – a first stage of getting the fits to neural data approximately 
right and a second stage where parameters of the HDR and the LFPàHDR mapping are 
iteratively optimized to fit neural data. 
More generally, the present simulations show how neural process models can usefully 
contribute to a deeper understanding of what particular fMRI signatures like the asymptote effect 
actually indicate. To our knowledge, the asymptote effect has only been simulated using abstract 
mathematical models (see Bays, 2018 for a recent comparison of plateau vs. saturation models). 
While this can be useful, it can be difficult to adjudicate between competing theories at this level 
as the myriad papers contrasting slot and resource models can attest (e.g., Brady & Tenenbaum, 
2013; Donkin et al., 2013; Kary et al., 2016; Rouder et al., 2008; Sims et al., 2012). Our results 
show that neural process models can shed new light on these debates, clarifying why particular 
neural and behavioral patterns are evident in some experiments and not others.  
In the next section, we seek more direct evidence of the neural processes implemented in 
the DF model. Importantly, the model not only simulates the asymptote in activation observed in 
IPS, but makes quantitative predictions regarding neural dynamics on both correct and incorrect 
trials. Thus, we describe an fMRI study optimized to test hemodynamic predictions of the DF 
model. We then use our integrative cognitive neuroscience approach combined with general 
linear modeling to create a mapping from the neural dynamics in the DF model to neural 
dynamics in the brain.   
Testing novel predictions of the DF model: An fMRI study of VWM 
Having fixed the model parameters via simulations of data from Todd and Marois (2004), 
we examined our central question—whether the DF model predicts the localized neural 
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dynamics measured with fMRI as people engage in the change detection task on both correct and 
incorrect trials. Because the model generates specific neural patterns on every type of trial (see 
Figure 4), an optimal way to test the model is in a task where each trial type occurs with high 
frequency. Thus, we developed a change detection task that would yield many correct and 
incorrect trials for analysis, but above-chance responding (ensuring that participants were not 
guessing). Below we describe the task and details of the fMRI data collection. We then present 
behavioral data from a preliminary behavioral study and the fMRI study along with behavioral 
simulation results from the DF model. This sets the stage for a detailed examination of whether 
the hemodynamic patterns predicted by the model are evident in the fMRI data and whether such 
patterns are localized to specific brain regions that can be said to implement the particular neural 
processes instantiated by model components. 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
 Nineteen participants completed the fMRI study; data from three of these participants 
were not included in the final analyses due to equipment malfunction and unreadable fMR 
images (distribution of the final sample: 7 males; M age = 25.7 yrs, SD age = 4.2 yrs). Nine 
additional participants completed a preliminary behavioral study (3 males; M age = 23.4 yrs, SD 
age = 2.2 yrs). Informed consent was obtained from all participants and all research methods 
were approved by the Institutional Review Board at the University of Iowa. All participants were 
right-handed, had normal or corrected to normal vision, and did not have any medical condition 
which would interfere with the MR machine. 
Behavioral Task 
Each trial began with a verbal load (two aurally presented letters lasting for 1000 ms; see 
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Todd & Marois, 2004). Then an array of colored squares (24 x 24 pixels; 2° visual angle) was 
presented for 500 ms (randomly sampled from CIE*Lab color-space at least 60° apart in color 
space). Squares were randomly spaced at least 30° apart along an imaginary circle with a radius 
of 7° visual angle. Next was a delay (1200 ms) followed by the test array (1800 ms). Trials were 
separated by a jitter of either 1.5s, 3s, or 5s selected in a pseudorandom order in a ratio of 2:1:1 
ratio, respectively. On ‘same’ trials (50%), items were re-presented in their original locations. On 
‘different’ trials, items were again re-presented in the original locations but the color of a 
randomly-selected item was shifted 36° in color space (see Figure 8A). Participants responded 
with a button press. On 25% of trials, the verbal load was probed (adding 500 ms to the trial; see 
Todd and Marois, 2004; M correct = 75%; SD = 13%). This ensured that participants could not 
use verbal working memory to complete the task (because verbal working memory was occupied 
with the letter task). Participants completed 5 blocks of 120 trials (3 blocks at SS4; 1 block each 
of SS2, SS6) in one of two orders (2,4,6,4,4; 6,4,2,4,4). Each block was administered in an 
individual scan that lasted for 1,040 s. A robust number of error trials were obtained at SS4 (FA: 
M=28.7, SD= 10.4; Miss: M=65.8, SD= 15.3) and SS6 (FA: M=12.9, SD=4.5; Miss: M=31.1, 
SD=6.4). 
fMRI Acquisition 
The fMRI study used a 3T Siemens TIM Trio system using a 12-channel head coil. 
Anatomical T1 weighted volumes were collected using an MP-RAGE sequence. Functional 
BOLD imaging was acquired using an axial 2D echo-planar gradient echo sequence with the 
following parameters: TE=30ms, TR=2000ms, flip angle=70°, FOV=240x240mm, 
matrix=64x64, slice thickness/gap=4.0/1.0mm, and bandwidth=1920Hz/pixel.  
fMRI Preprocessing 
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Standard preprocessing was performed using AFNI (version 18.2.12) which included 
slice timing correction, outlier removal, motion correction, and spatial smoothing (Gaussian 
FWHM=5mm). The time series data were transformed into MNI space using an affine transform 
to warp the data to the common coordinate system. The T1-weighted images were used to define 
the transformation to the common coordinate system. T1 images were registered to the 
MNI_avg152T1+tlrc template. The coordinates for the regions of interest described by 
Wijeakumar et al. (2015) were used to define the centers of 1 cm3 spheres. Since the time series 
data was mapped to a common coordinate system, the average time course for each participant 
was then estimated using the defined sphere.  
Simulation Methods 
Simulations were conducted as described above with the inputs modified to reflect the 
timing and stimuli properties (e.g., color separation) in the task given to participants. Initial 
observations indicated that the small metric changes in the task made detecting changes difficult 
in the model. Thus, to obtain better fits to the behavior data we changed one model parameters 
governing the resting level of the “different” node. For the previous simulations this value was -
9, but for our version of the task with small metric changes we increased this value to -5 to be 
closer to threshold. 
Behavioral Results and Discussion 
Figure 8 shows the behavioral data from the preliminary behavioral study (Figure 8B), 
from the fMRI study (Figure 8C), and from the model (Figure 8D). Note that error bars were 
generated by running multiple iterations of the model and calculating standard deviation across 
runs. A two-way ANOVA (SS x Change trial) on the behavioral data from the fMRI study 
revealed main effects of SS (F(2,15)=153.06, p< .001) and Change trial (F(1,16)=88.90, p< .001) 
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and an interaction between SS and Change trial (F(2,15)=10.98, p< .001). Follow up t-tests 
showed that participants performed significantly better on SS2 compared to both SS4 (t(16)= 
16.29, p< .001) and SS6 (t(16)= 14.00, p< .001), and better on SS4 compared to SS6 (t(16)= 
7.31, p< .001). Participants performed better on Same trials compared to Different trials at SS2 
(t(16)= 3.843, p< .001), SS4 (t(16)= 8.47, p< .001), and SS6 (t(16)= 8.13, p< .001). Importantly, 
all participants performed better than chance suggesting that they were not simply guessing (all t 
values > 4.5, p < .001). 
The DF model that simulated data from Todd and Marois (2004) and Magen et al. (2009) 
also captured the data from the fMRI study and the preliminary behavioral study well (RMSE = 
0.11 across both datasets) demonstrating that the model generalizes to behavioral differences 
across tasks (see Table 1). In summary, behavioral data from the present study show that 
participants generated many correct and incorrect responses, yet remained above-chance in all 
conditions. This provides an optimal data set, therefore, to test the neural predictions of the DF 
model regarding the origin of errors in change detection. The model did a good job reproducing 
these behavioral data with a single modification to a parameter across simulations (changing the 
resting level of the “different’ node for our metric version of the task). This sets the stage to test 
the neural predictions of the DF model to determine whether the model can simultaneously 
capture both brain and behavior. 
Testing Predictions of the DF Model with GLM 
To test the hemodynamic predictions of the model, we adapted a general linear model 
(GLM) approach. As noted previously, it would be ideal to test the DF model against a 
competitor model, but no such competitor exists that predicts both brain and behavior. Instead, 
we asked whether the DF model out-performs the standard statistical modeling approach to fMRI 
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data using GLM. 
In conventional fMRI analysis, a model of brain activity that has been parameterized for 
each stimulus condition is estimated via linear regression. A set of parametric maps for each 
condition is then constructed and used to infer locations in the brain where these model 
coefficients are statistically non-zero or different between conditions. The proposed innovation is 
to use the DF model to reparametize the GLMs because the DF model predicts the expected 
patterns across conditions. The DF model in this case constitutes a task-independent and 
transferable bridge theory with the ability to make simultaneous task-specific predictions of both 
brain and behavior. Note that this approach is novel relative to existing fMRI methods such as 
dynamic causal modeling (DCM; Penny, Stephan, Mechelli, & Friston, 2004) in that most 
common variants of DCM use deterministic state-space models while the DF model is stochastic 
(but see Daunizeau et al., 2012). Moreover, the DF model provides a direct link to behavioral 
measures while DCM does not (but see Rigoux and Daunizeau, 2015 for steps in this direction). 
More generally, DF and DCM have different goals with DCM using fMRI data to make 
hypothesis-led inferences about interactions among regions, and DF providing a predictive 
model of both brain and behavior. 
The next question was how to apply the GLM-based approach to the brain. One option is 
an exploratory whole-brain approach. We opted, however, for a more constrained approach using 
a recent meta-analysis of the VWM literature (Wijeakumar et al., 2015). In particular, we 
extracted the BOLD response from 23 regions of interest (ROIs) implicated in fMRI studies of 
VWM. Twenty-one of these ROIs were from Wijeakumar et al. (2015); we added two ROIs so 
all bilateral entries were present with the exception of lSFG which was centrally located.  
Consider what this GLM-based approach might reveal. It could be that specific model 
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components such as the WM field capture variance in just 1 or 2 ROIs. This would constitute 
evidence that the WM function was implemented in those cortical areas. It is also possible, 
however, that multiple components capture activation in the same ROI. In this case, we can 
conclude that multiple functionalities are evident in this ROI and the model does not unpack the 
specificity of the function. For instance, the CF and WM fields work together during the initial 
encoding and consolidation of the colors, while CF and the ‘different’ node conspire during 
comparison. In the brain, these functionalities might be handled by separate but coupled cortical 
fields. Indeed, we know this is the case already and have proposed a more complex DF 
architecture to pull functions like encoding and consolidation apart (see Schoner et al., 2015). 
Unfortunately, this new model is more complex, harder to fit to behavior, and has not been tested 
as fully as the model used here. We acknowledge up front, then, that there might be some lack of 
specificity in the mapping of model components to ROIs that suggests more work needs to be 
done to articulate what these brain regions are doing. Our hope is that the work we present here 
gives us a theoretical tool to use as we search for this more articulated understanding of VWM. 
To determine whether the model statistically outperforms the standard task-based GLM 
approach and makes accurate predictions about activation in specific cortical regions, we used a 
Bayesian Multilevel Model (MLM) approach using equation 8 with d ROIs, N time points, and p 
regressors where Y is an N by d data matrix, X is an N by p design matrix, W is a p by d matrix 
of regression coefficients, and E is an N by d matrix of errors (using functions provided by 
SPM12). The errors, E, have a zero-mean Normal distribution with [d x d] precision matrix Λ. 
Y= XW + E 
 A specific MLM can then be specified by the choice of the design matrix. In the 
following analyses, we use regressors derived from the DF model or sets of regressors capturing 
(8)	
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the factorial design of the experiment (e.g., main effects of set-size, accuracy, same/different, or 
interactions thereof). A Variational Bayes algorithm (Roberts & Penny, 2002) was then used to 
estimate the model evidence for each MLM, p(Y|m), and the posterior distributions over the 
regression coefficients p(W|Y,m) and noise precision p(Λ|Y,m). The model evidence takes into 
account model fit but also penalizes models for their complexity (Bishop, 2006; Penny et al., 
2004). It can be used in the context of random effects model selection to find the best model over 
a group. 
Methods 
To assess the quality of fit between the predicted hemodynamic responses from the 
model components and the BOLD data obtained from participants, we first ran the model 
through the fMRI paradigm 10 times, calculating the average LFP timecourse for each model 
component (‘different’ node, ‘same’ node, CF, WM) on each trial type (same correct, same 
incorrect, different correct, different incorrect) for each set-size (2, 4, and 6). Figure 9 shows the 
full set of hemodynamic predictions for all trial types and components calculated from these 
LFPs (showing M HDR signal change for simplicity). To the extent that the model captures what 
is happening in the brain during change detection, we should see these same patterns reflected in 
participants’ fMRI data. Note that these predictions are quite specific. For instance, as noted 
previously, the ‘same’ node shows a stronger hemodynamic response on hits than on correct 
rejections. This holds across memory loads. By contrast, the ‘different’ node shows a stronger 
hemodynamic response on hit and miss trials, except at the highest memory load where the 
strongest hemodynamic response is on false alarms. This reflects the strong ‘different’ signal on 
false alarm trials at high memory loads when a WM peak fails to consolidate. The other two 
layers in the model – CF and WM – show strong effects of the memory load, with an increase in 
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activation as the set size increases. Interestingly, differences across trial types emerge in WM as 
the memory load increases, with higher activation for miss and correct rejection trials, that is, 
when the model responds ‘same’.  
Next, the LFP timecourses were turned into subject-specific time courses. These time 
courses were created by setting the time windows corresponding to each trial equal to the 
average LFP timecourse based on the timing and type of each trial for each participant. For each 
participant, four separate time courses were created corresponding to the LFPs from the 
‘different’, ‘same’, CF, and WM model components. The variations in timing in the time courses 
for a participant reflect the random jitter between trials from the fMRI experiment, while the 
variations in the trial types reflect both the trial-by-trial randomization in trial types as well as 
participant’s performance—whether each trial was, for instance, a set size 2 ‘correct’ trial, a set 
size 4 ‘incorrect’ trial, and so on. The LFP time courses were then convolved with an impulse 
response function and down-sampled at 2 TR to match the fMRI experiment. Individual-level 
GLMs were first fit to each participant’s fMRI data. These results were then evaluated at the 
group level using Bayesian MLM.  
Results 
Categorical versus DF Model 
 In a first analysis, we generated standard task-based regressors that include the stimulus 
timing for each trial type. For example, a standard task-based analysis of the change detection 
task would model hemodynamic activation across voxels with regressors for correct-same trials, 
correct-change trials, incorrect-same trials, and incorrect-change trials at each set-size – 12 
categorical regressors in total (4 trial types * 3 set sizes).  To explore the full range of task-based 
models, we specified eight models based on combinations of task-based regressors: 1) a model 
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with three factors that categorize trials based on set-size, change, and accuracy (12 total task-
based regressors), 2) a model with two factors that categorize trials based on set-size and change 
(6 total task-based regressors), 3) a model with two factors that categorize trials based on set-size 
and accuracy (6 total task-based regressors), 4) a model with two factors that categorize trials 
based on change and accuracy (4 total task-based regressors), 5) a model with one factor that 
categorizes trials based on set-size (3 total task-based regressors), 6) a model with one factor that 
categorizes trials based on change (2 total task-based regressors), 7) a model with one factor that 
categorizes trials based on accuracy (2 total task-based regressors), and 8) a null model (1 
constant regressor). For all of these models, the hemodynamic response at each trial was 
modeled based on the GAM function in AFNI.  
Second, we generated regressors from the four components of the DF model as described 
above. Note that all nine models were individualized based on the specific sequence of trials for 
each participant. Additionally, all models included 6 regressors based on motion (roll, pitch, 
yaw, translations right-left, translations inferior-superior, and translations anterior-posterior), 6 
regressors based on the motion regressors with a time lag of 1 TR, and 25 baseline parameters 
reflecting a 4 degree polynomial model for the baseline of each of the five blocks. Lastly, all 
models were normalized to have zero-mean unit variance among columns prior to model 
estimation (for each column, the mean was subtracted and then divided by the standard 
deviation). 
 Random Effects Bayesian Model Comparison (Rigoux et al., 2014; Stephan et al., 2009) 
was then implemented across all models and participants using the statistical function provided 
by SPM12. This method uses the concept of model frequencies, which are the relative prevalence 
of models in the population from which the sample subjects were drawn. For example, model 
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frequencies of 0.90 and 0.10 indicate a prevalence of 90 percent for model 1 and 10 percent for 
model 2. Random Effects Bayesian Model Comparison provides for statistical inferences over 
model frequencies and Stephan et al. (2009) describe an iterative algorithm for computing them. 
Initial inspection of the data revealed that frequencies were non-uniform (Bayes Omnibus Risk 
(BOR) = 4.78 x 10-5). The DF model, accuracy categorical model, and change categorical model 
had the largest frequencies of 0.44, 0.20, and 0.12, respectively. The probability that the DF 
model had the highest model frequency (quantified using the “protected exceedance 
probability”) is PXP = 0.9312. This value is a posterior probability so has no simple relation to a 
classical p-value. One can also express posterior probabilities as Bayes Factors, with the Log 
Bayes Factor being the log-odds of the marginal likelihoods. For example, for PXP=0.9312, the 
log Bayes Factor is log [0.9312/(1-0.9312)]=2.61 and the Bayes Factor is exp(2.61)=13.5, 
meaning there is 13.5 times the evidence for the statement than against it. Conventionally, a 
Bayes factor of 1 to 3 is considered “Weak” evidence, 3 to 20 as “Positive” evidence, and 20 to 
150 as “Strong” evidence (Kass & Raftery, 1995). It is in this sense that the DF model “best” 
explains the fMRI data. In our group of 16 participants, the posterior model probabilities were 
highest for the DF model for 10 individuals, the accuracy categorical model for 4 individuals, 
and the change categorical model for 2 individuals. Table 2 shows the log Bayes Factors for the 
different models across participants. These results indicate that some individuals showed 
differences in activation across accuracy or change factors that were not effectively captured by 
the DF model. 
Testing the Specificity of the DF Model 
 It is an open question to what extent the dynamics implemented by the model are 
important for its explanatory value in the MLM results. One of our key claims is that the neural 
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dynamics that are implemented in the model provide an explanation of what the brain is doing to 
give rise to same/different decisions in the change detection task, both on correct and incorrect 
trials. To probe this issue, we generated new sets of four randomized DF regressors and re-ran 
the MLM analysis. For each participant and for each trial, an LFP was selected from a randomly 
determined trial type and component. These LFPs were slotted in based on the timing of trials for 
each individual participant and then convolved to generate sets of 4 DF model regressors as 
described above. We refer to this as the Random Trial and Component DF Model (DF-RTC). If 
the structure of activation within each component for each trial type is important for the 
explanatory value of the model, then this model should do poorly compared to the categorical 
model.  
Results from the MLM analysis showed that observed model frequencies were non-
uniform (BOR = 1.20 x 10-5). In contrast to the prior analysis, the DF model was not the most 
frequent; rather, the accuracy categorical model, change categorical model, and DF-RTC model 
had the largest frequencies of 0.47, 0.21, and 0.08, respectively. The probability that the 
accuracy categorical model had the highest model frequency is PXP = 0.9459. Thus, in this new 
analysis, the accuracy categorical model best explains the fMRI data. In our group of 16 
participants, the posterior model probabilities were highest for the accuracy categorical model 
for 11 individuals, the change categorical model for 2 individuals, and the DF-RTC model for 1 
individual. Importantly, these results show that the DF-RTC model regressors poorly explain the 
fMRI data when the trial and component structure is removed.  
 Next, we asked whether preserving the component structure but disrupting the trial 
structure would impact the explanatory power of the DF model. To accomplish this, we 
generated new sets of four DF regressors for each participant. In particular, an LFP was selected 
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from a randomly determined trial type on each trial, but each regressor was sampled from a 
single component to maintain the ingrity of the component-level predictions. As before, these 
LFPs were inserted into the predicted time series based on the timing of each individual trial for 
each participant, the individual-level GLMs were re-estimated, and the MLM analysis was 
repeated at the group level. We refer to this as the Random-Trial DF model (DF-RT). If the 
specific structure of activation pattern across trials within each component is important for the 
explanatory value of the model, then this model should do poorly compared to the categorical 
model. If, however, this model still captures the data well, then this would suggest that the 
relative differences in activation dynamics across components are an important contributor to the 
model’s explanation of the data. 
In this new analysis, we observed that frequencies were non-uniform (BOR = 4.78 x 10-
5). The DF-RT model, accuracy categorical model and change categorical model had the largest 
frequencies of 0.44, 0.20, and 0.12, respectively. The probability that the DF-RT model has 
higher model frequency than any other model is PXP = 0.9312. Thus, the DF-RT model still 
“best” explains the fMRI data. In our group of 16 participants, the posterior model probabilities 
were highest for the DF-RT model for 12 individuals, the accuracy categorical model for 2 
individuals, and the change categorical model for 2 individuals.  
We then asked whether the “standard” DF model provides a better fit to the data than the 
DF-RT model. In this comparison, we observed that frequencies were non-uniform (BOR = 
0.0396). The standard DF model had a frequency of 0.83 which was higher than the DF-RT 
model  frequency of 0.17 (PXP = 0.9789). Thus, the standard DF model better explains the fMRI 
data compared to the random-trial DF model. In our group of 16 participants, the posterior model 
probabilities were highest for the standard DF model for 15 individuals. Thus, the detailed 
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predictions of the DF model regarding how brain activity varies over trial types is, in fact, 
important in capturing the fMRI data from the present study. 
Are all DF model components necessary? 
The correlation among the DF regressors was very high, most likely reflecting the strong 
reciprocal connections between model components. Averaged over the group, the maximum 
correlation was between CF and WM (r2 = .93) and the minimum was between the ‘same’ node 
and WM (r2= .52). Thus, it is important to assess whether all model components are adding 
explanatory value.  
We compared the model evidence of the full model with all four regressors to four other 
models that eliminated one regressor. These results indicated that removing the ‘different’ node 
regressor yielded a better model. Specifically, the frequency of this model was higher than the 
other four models that were compared (PXP = .9998). The model frequencies were non-uniform 
(Bayes Omnibus Risk (BOR) = 5.72 x 10-7) indicating a very low probability that the model 
frequencies are equal (this is a posterior probability and can also be converted into a Bayes 
Factor as above). We examined whether further reducing the model would yield a better model. 
We compared the model with the ‘different’ node regressor removed to three other models with 
one of the remaining three regressors removed. Results from this comparison indicated that the 
model with three regressors had the highest model frequency, PXP = 1.0000, and the model 
frequencies were significantly non-uniform (BOR = 2.26 x 10-7). From this we concluded that 
the best variant of the DF model across participants was a 3-regressor model with CF, WM, and 
‘same’ regressors included. 
In an additional MLM analysis, we examined how the reduced model compared to the set 
of categorical models described above. We observed that frequencies were non-uniform (BOR = 
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4.34 x 10-6). The DF model, accuracy categorical model, and change categorical model  had the 
largest frequencies of 0.52, 0.12, and 0.12, respectively. The probability that the DF model has 
the highest model frequency is PXP = 0.9922. Thus, the reduced DF model still “best” explains 
the fMRI data. In our group of 16 participants, the posterior model probabilities were highest for 
the DF model for 12 individuals, the accuracy categorical model for 2 individuals, and the 
change categorical model for 2 individuals (see Table 2).  
To explore why the ‘different’ node regressor failed to contribute much to model 
performance, we explored the multicollinearity of the four DF regressors using Belsley 
collinearity diagnostics (Belsley, 1991). This revealed that the three remaining regressors were 
multicollinear (variance decompositions larger than .5), and that the ‘different’ node was 
independent of this collinearity (condIdx=56.97; ‘different’= 0.3155, ‘same’= 0.8212, CF= 
0.9945, WM= 0.9811). Interestingly, when we examined the connection weights between the 
‘different’ node and the regions of interest, all of the regions with relatively large ‘different’ 
weightings had negative weights. Thus, the ‘different’ hemodynamics in the model appear to be 
relatively distinct and inversely mapped to brain hemodynamics. This may indicate that 
difference detection in the model is too simplistic. For instance, evidence suggests that people 
typically both detect changes in the test array and shift attention to the changed location (Hyun, 
Woodman, Vogel, Hollingworth, & Luck, 2009); this second operation is not captured by our 
model.  
Mapping model components to cortical regions 
  The analyses thus far indicate that the DF model provides a better account of the fMRI 
data than 8 standard categorical models, the trial type and component structure of the DF model 
regressors both matter to the quality of the data fits, and a streamlined 3-
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provides the most parsimonious account of the data. Our next goal was to understand how the 
model maps onto specific brain regions and which aspects of the fMRI data the model captures. 
In this context, it is important to emphasize that the beta weights for each component of the 
model are estimated together along with the other components that are being considered. That is, 
neural activation in a ROI is the dependent variable and the predicted neural activation from the 
model components are the independent variables. Since the model components are entered into 
the model together, the beta weight estimated for each component controls for the other 
predictors. At the group level, described below, the statistical comparison was performed 
individually on each component using a t-test. Here, the question is whether each component 
contributes significantly to prediction at the group level, allowing for inferences to be made 
about the partial correlation between each model component and each region of interest. 
We performed group-level t-tests (Bonferroni corrected) to examine which of the three 
components from the reduced DF model explained activation in different cortical regions across 
our group of participants. We focused on connections that were positive. Note that negative 
connections were observed (i.e., ‘same’ node: lIFG, lIPS, lOCC, lSFG, lsIPS, rIFG, rMFG, 
rOCC, rsIPS; CF: lTPJ, rTPJ; WM: alIPS, lIFG, lIPS, lsIPS, rIFG, rsIPS). In all but one case 
(rMFG), a negative connection was paired with a positive connection with another component. 
Thus, negative connections could be explained by the inverse nature of different components 
involved in “same” and “different” decisions, in which case it is easier to interpret the positive 
connection weights. The CF component explained significant activation in 9 regions (alIPS: 
t(14)=4.85, p< .001; lIFG: t(14)= 5.65, p< .001;  lIPS: t(14)= 5.60, p< .001; lOCC: t(14)= 4.41, 
p< .001; lSFG: t(14)= 4.67, p< .001; lsIPS: t(14)= 4.94, p< .001; rIFG: t(14)= 5.56, p< .001; 
rOCC: t(14)= 4.32, p< .001; and rsIPS: t(14)= 6.79, p< .001). Additionally, WM and the ‘same’ 
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node explained activation in lTPJ (t(14)= 8.25, p< .001; t(14)= 7.83, p< .001) and rTPJ (t(14)= 
9.59, p< .001; t(14)= 7.89, p< .001). Figure 10A shows the mapping of model components to 
cortical regions. A first observation from this pattern of results is that bilateral IPS is once again 
mapped to the contrast layer, consistent with our first simulation experiment. In addition to IPS, 
the CF regressor also captured significant variance in other regions associated with the dorsal 
frontoparietal network including bilateral OCC and IFG, as well as another brain region 
commonly linked to an aspect of the ventral right frontoparietal network –SFG (Corbetta & 
Shulman, 2002).  
Given the striking presence of bilateral activation in the t-test results, we tested if the 
regression vectors were significantly different between paired regions across hemispheres. In our 
sample of ROIs there were 11 such regions (e.g., left/right IPS, left/right IFG, etc). We tested for 
differences within-subject using the Savage-Dickey (Rosa, Friston, & Penny, 2012) 
approximation of model evidence and then examined consistency over the group (using random 
effects model comparison). For all pairs, no log Bayes Factors were decisively negative. This 
indicates that the regression vectors were different. Thus, although both hemispheres may be 
engaged in the same type of function (e.g., contrasting items with the content of VWM), 
activation profiles between hemispheres differ. This is consistent with data suggesting, for 
instance, that IPS might be most sensitive to visual information in the contralateral visual field 
(Gao et al., 2011; Robitaille, Grimault, & Jolicœur, 2009).  
To asses the quality of the data fits between the DF regressors and activation in these 
brain regions, we plotted the predicted data from the model against the fMRI timecourses. We 
selected three regions of interest – rTPJ which was mapped to the WM+Same component across 
the group (Figure 10B), lIPS which was mapped to the CF component across the group (Figure 
MODEL-BASED	fMRI		 	 62		
10C), and a contrast area -- lMFG -- which was not robustly mapped to any component (Figure 
10D). In each panel, we show an example plot from one individual who ‘preferred’ the DF 
model based on our MLM analysis along with data from one individual who ‘preferred’ the 
accuracy categorical model. The annotation in each figure (see green ovals) show time epochs 
where the preferred model showed a better fit to the empirical data. For instance, in the top panel 
of Figure 10B, there are several epochs where the DF model fit the empirical data better; by 
contrast, the categorical model generally shows a negative undershoot relative to the data. In the 
lower panel, however, there is a run of trials where the categorical model provides a better fit. 
Figure 10C shows comparable results, with clear time epochs where the DF model (top panel) or 
categorical model (lower panel) provides a better data fit. Finally, in Figure 10D, one can see 
two examples where neither model fits the BOLD data particularly well. 
To explore individual differences in further detail, we examined whether the connection 
values (i.e., b weights) between model components and cortical regions were correlated 
(Spearman’s correlation) with an individual’s WM performance as indexed by the maximum 
value of Pashler’s K. Note that our sample size of 16 may not be large enough to provide strong 
evidence of  brain-behavior relationships. Further, we tested only positive b weights between 
regions and model components (13 total comparisons). Using the Benjamin-Hochberg 
(Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995) correction procedure and a false-discovery rate of .1 (given the 
exploratory nature of these comparisons), we found that capacity was significantly correlated 
with the connection weight between WM and lTPJ (r=-0.66, p=.0055; Figure 10E). As is evident 
in the scatter plot, higher capacity individuals show weaker b weights for the WM component in 
lTPJ. Recall from the behavioral data in Figure 8C that performance drops over set sizes, 
particularly in the ‘different’ condition; thus, higher capacity individuals (who had the highest 
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percent correct) show less of a ‘same’ bias and more selective responding on ‘different’ trials. 
This is consistent with the correlation in TPJ: higher capacity individuals show a weaker ‘same’ 
bias in TPJ (negative correlations between brain activation and the WM regressor).  
Assessing the quality of the mapping of model components to cortical regions 
One way to evaluate the mapping of model components to cortical regions was shown in 
Figure 10, where we highlighted both group-level data as well as data from individual 
participants. While this is helpful in evaluating model fits, in this final section we use a 
quantitative metric to help understand what details of the data the DF and categorical models are 
explaining. 
To quantitatively assess the quality of the fit for the DF model relative to the categorical 
models, we examined the precision of the different models. Precision was derived from the 
inverse covariance matrix for each model. Specificially, given the linear model Y = XW + 
E where the errors have covariance matrix C, the corresponding precision matrix is L (the 
inverse of C). The precision metric reflects the partial correlation between variables independent 
of covariation with other variables (Varoquaux & Craddock, 2013). We defined a diagonal 
version of the precision matrix to get region by region precisions: l = diag(L) such that l(r) is 
high if the model fit is good in region r, that is, if a lot of unique variance is captured in this 
region. Improvements in model precision were calculated as the relative percent improvement in 
precision for the DF model relative to the different categorical models. For instance, we can 
calculate the precision of the DF model for subject 1 in left IPS, the precision of a categorical 
model for subject 1 in left IPS, and then compute the relative percent increase (or decrease) in 
precision for the DF model. 
Figure 11A shows the average improvement in precision over subjects for the 23 brain 
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regions. The arrows below specific regions highlight the mapping of model components to 
regions shown in Figure 10A (yellow arrows = CF, red arrows = WM+Same). As can be seen in 
the figure, regions mapped to specific DF regressors in the group-level comparisons generally 
showed a large relative increase in precision for the DF model (positive values). Interestingly, 
some regions such as rFEF showed a large average change in precision even though this region 
was not mapped to a particular DF component in the group-level t-tests. Figure 11B shows the 
average improvement in precision over regions split by participants. The arrows below specific 
participants indicate the participants that ‘preferred’ a categorical model in the MLM analysis. 
These participants all have small changes in relative precision, indicating that the precision of the 
DF model was only slightly higher than the precision of the categorical model. Considered 
together, then, the data in Figure 11 largely mirror the group-level results that mapped DF 
components to ROIs as well as the MLM results showing which models were preferred by which 
subjects. 
Critically, the precision for some regions for the categorical-preferring participants 
showed higher precision for the categorical model of interest. This can give us a sense of what 
the DF model is failing to capture. Figure 12 shows two exemplary participants. Figure 12A 
shows data from subject 1 -- a DF ‘preferring’ participant with high relative precision in rIPS 
(relative precision = 1.7527), while Figure 12B shows data from subject 8 – a categorical 
‘preferring’ participant with a negative relative precision in this same ROI, that is, higher 
precision for the change categorical model (relative precision = -1.9862). Each panel shows the 
BOLD data, the DF time series predictions, and the categorical time series predictions with the 
data split by trial types. All time traces were constructed by averaging the time series data from 
trial onset (0s) through 10 s post-trial onset, where data were baselined at 0s.  
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As can be seen in Figure 12A, the DF-preferring participant showed a large 
hemodynamic response in the SS2-correct conditions as well as a large hemodynamic response 
on all SS6 trial types (bottom row). This highlights how brain activity is modulated by the 
memory load. Note that the SS4 condition had the most trials; this appears to have reduced the 
magnitude of the response (note the scale difference in the middle row). Comparing the DF time 
series data with the categorical time series data, the DF model data are closer to the empirical 
values for all SS2 trials, for SS4-same-correct trials, and SS6-same trials (both correct and 
incorrect), with mixed results in the other conditions. Thus, in this region, the DF model is doing 
relatively well, with weaker performance on high set size change trials. Note that the amplitude 
of the model predictions are low in all cases reflecting the limited degrees of freedom in the 
overall model (only 3 predictors).  
In Figure 12B, we see a similar modulation in the HDR over SS, although this participant 
shows a robust HDR across all SS2 conditions (top row). Looking at the relative accuracy of the 
DF and categorical time series data, the top row shows mixed results with one exception  -- the 
DF model is closer to the data on the SS2-different-incorrect trials. The categorical model 
generally fares better on the SS4 trials (middle row). SS6 is again mixed with the categorical 
model closer to the BOLD data, particularly early in the trial. Interestingly, even though this 
region showed high precision for the categorical model, this improved fit is subtle. We conclude, 
therefore, that the DF model is generally doing reasonably well -- even with categorical-
preferring participants – and is not overtly failing on a small subset of conditions. 
Finally, we examined the differences between the observed BOLD data measured from 
rIPS relative to the DF and categorical models. Here, we focused on the accuracy and change 
categorical models since these were the only categorical models ‘preferred’ by any participants. 
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First, we computed the average absolute difference between the DF model and the BOLD signal 
and the categorical models and the BOLD signal to determine how much these models deviated 
from the observed BOLD signal for each trial type. Plotted in Figure 13 is the difference in 
deviation between the two categorical models and the DF model averaged across participants. 
This visualization provides a sense of which trial types the DF model did well (where ther are 
large positive values in Figure 13) and where the DF model did poorer (where there are negative 
values in Figure 13). As can be seen, the DF model does very well relative to these categorical 
models on incorrect trials at SS2 and across trial types for SS6. Most notably, the DF model does 
the worst on correct change trials at SS2. Note, however, the degree of difference for this trial 
type is small relative to the degree of difference on other trial types in which the DF model does 
better.   
General Discussion 
The central goal of the current paper was to test whether a neural dynamic model of 
visual working memory could directly bridge between brain and behavior. We initially fit a 
model that simulates behavioral and hemodynamic data simultaneously to data from two fMRI 
studies that reported seemingly contradictory findings. The model simulated results from both 
studies. Interestingly, simulated results from the model’s contrast layer most closely mirrored 
fMRI data from IPS, suggesting that IPS plays more of a role in comparison and change 
detection than in the maintenance of items in VWM. Moreover, the model explained why IPS 
fails to show an asymptote in a long-delay paradigm – the longer-delay allows for more subtle 
variations in the neural dynamics of the contrast layer to be reflected in the hemodynamic 
response.  
We then used a Bayesian MLM approach to test model predictions against BOLD data 
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from a set of ROIs to assess the fit of the model’s predicted patterns of hemodynamic activation. 
This method was used to shed light on the mechanisms that underlie VWM and change detection 
performance with a special emphasis on the neural processes that underlie errors in change 
detection. Results showed that the model-based regressors explained more variance in the BOLD 
data than standard task-based categorical regressors. Additional analyses showed that both the 
component structure of the model and the details of neural activation on each trial type mattered 
to the quality of the data fits. Evidence that the trial types matter is important because the DF 
model offers a novel account of why people make errors in change detection. In particular, the 
model predicts a false alarm when an item is not maintained in WM and a miss due to decision 
errors caused by widespread suppression of the contrast layer. By contrast, previous cognitive 
accounts hypothesized that misses occur when items are not maintained in WM and false alarms 
reflect decision errors / guessing (Cowan, 2001; Pashler, 1988). The fMRI data support the DF 
account. 
The model-based fMRI approach not only provided robust fits to the BOLD data in 
specific ROIs, this approach also conferred new understanding of the neural bases of VWM. In 
particular, group-level analyses mapped model components to patterns of activation in specific 
regions of the brain and this mapping offers an explanation of the functional significance of this 
brain activity. Although our results here are still correlational in nature, future work could use 
methods such as TMS to more directly probe model predictions that can push this explanation to 
the causal level. Notably, once again, the contrast layer provided the best account of data from 
IPS. This helps resolve on-going debates in the literature. Previous work has suggested IPS is a 
critical site for VWM because this area shows an asymptote in the BOLD signal at higher set 
sizes (Todd & Marois, 2004) while other work suggests IPS plays an attentional role 
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(Szczepanski, Pinsk, Douglas, Kastner, & Saalmann, 2013). Our results provide a new account 
of these data suggesting that IPS is critically involved in the comparison operation. This 
highlights how a model-based fMRI approach can lead to an integrated account when current 
experimental results have yielded contradictory findings.  
More generally, the contrast field provided a robust account of neural activation across 10 
regions linked to a dorsal frontoparietal network as well as key regions in a ventral right 
frontoparietal network (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). One critique of the model is that it failed to 
make functional distinctions across these 10 ROIs. We suspect this reflects the simplicity of the 
model tested here. The model only had four components. While results show that these 
components were sufficient to capture key aspects of the behavioral and neural dynamics in the 
task, the model does not specify all the processes that underlie participants’ performance. For 
instance, in the current model, encoding and comparison both happen in the CF layer. In a more 
recent model of VWM and change detection (Schneegans, 2016; Schneegans, Spencer, Schoner, 
Hwang, & Hollingworth, 2014), we have unpacked these functions by including new cortical 
fields that implement encoding within lower-level visual fields as well as attentional fields that 
capture known shifts of attention that occur in change detection. If we were to test this more 
articulated VWM model using the tools developed here, it is possible that some of the CF ROIs 
like OCC would now show an encoding function while other ROIs like SFG would be mapped to 
an attentional function. Future work will be needed to explore these possibilities. Importantly, 
this work can directly use all of the tools developed here.  
Another key result in the present paper was the mapping of the WM and ‘same’ 
functionalities to brain activation in bilateral TPJ. The link between WM and TPJ is consistent 
with previous fMRI studies (Todd et al., 2005). Moreover, we found significant correlations 
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between the WM and ‘same’ b weights in rTPJ and individual differences in WM capacity. 
Although this suggests TPJ is a central hub for VWM, one could once again critique the 
specificity of the model predictions: shouldn’t the model reveal a neural site for VWM that is 
distinct from activation predicted by the ‘same’ node? We suspect there are two key limitations 
on this front. First, as noted above, the model is relatively simple. In our recent model of VWM, 
for instance, we tackle how working memories for features are bound to spatial positions to 
create an integrated working memory for objects in a scene that is distributed across multiple 
cortical fields. Moreover, working memory peaks in this new model build sequentially as 
attention is shifted from item to item. This leads to differences in the neural dynamics of working 
memory through time that are not captured by the model used here (which builds peaks in 
parallel). It is possible that this more articulated model of VWM would help pull part the details 
of neural processing in TPJ, potentially capturing data in other brain regions as well that the 
current model failed to detect. 
A second limitation of the present work was hinted at by our simulations of data from 
Magen et al. (2009). Those simulations show that short-delay change detection paradigms may 
provide only limited information about the neural dynamics that underlie VWM because subtle 
variations in the dynamics are not detected in the slow hemodynamic response. We suspect this 
contributed to the high collinearity of our model regressors which ultimately contributed to the 
removal of the ‘different’ regressor in our final model. That is, the design of the task may not 
have been optimized to elicit distinguishing patterns of activation from the model components. 
One way to reduce collinearity in future model-based fMRI would could be to vary the task. If, 
for instance, the model was put in a variety of task settings, including both short-delay and long-
delay trials as well as variations in the memory load, the collinearity would likely reduce. Indeed, 
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one advantage of having a neural process model is that the properties of the design matrix could 
be optimized in advance by simulating the model directly. To explore the relationship between 
model dynamics and hemodynamics in more detail, we ran additional simulations in which we 
varied the timing parameters of the canonical HRF function used to generate hemodynamics 
from the simulated LFP (see supplemental figure). This illustrates how future work can use an 
iterative process to not only inform interpretation of neural data but to influence the parameters 
used in the model. 
In summary, although there are limitations to our findings, the integrative cognitive 
neuroscience approach used here opens up a new way to assess how well a particular class of 
neural process theories explain and predict functional brain data and behavioral data. In this 
regard, the DF model presents a bridge between cognitive and neural concepts that can shed new 
light on the functional aspects of brain activation.  
Relations between the DF model and other theoretical accounts 
DFT provides a rich computational framework that generates novel predictions not 
explained by other accounts focusing on slots and resources (Bays et al., 2009; Bays & Husain, 
2009; Brady & Tenenbaum, 2013; Donkin et al., 2013; Kary et al., 2016; Rouder et al., 2008b; 
Sims et al., 2012; Wilken & Ma, 2004). One novel prediction previously reported using a DF 
model of VWM demonstrated enhanced change detection performance for items in memory that 
are metrically similar (Johnson, Spencer, Luck, et al., 2009). Other more recent models have also 
addressed metric effects. For example, Sim, Jacobs, and Knill (2012) explain such effects in 
terms of informational bits contained in the memory array. Items that are more similar to one 
another contain fewer informational bits, leading to items being encoded more precisely and 
change detection performance is improved. The model reported by Oberauer and Lin (2017) 
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implement neural processes that explain the benefits of have similarity between items in VWM. 
In this case, the benefit arises from the partial overlap of representations in VWM which 
mutually support one another. This contrasts with the explanation offered by the DNF model 
which suggests that benefits in performance arising from item similarity are due to the 
sharpening of representations through shared lateral inhibition (Johnson, Spencer, Luck, et al., 
2009).  
Here, we extended the DF model to also generate novel neural predictions which no other 
behaviorally-grounded model of VWM has achieved. Beyond the capability to generate both 
behavioral and neural predictions, the DF model of change detection is also the only model that 
specifies the neural processes that underlie comparison (Johnson et al., 2014). Swan and Wyble 
(2014) implement a comparison process in their model that calculates the difference between 
items held in VWM and items displayed in the test array. This calculation results in a vector 
whose angle is the degree of difference between a memory item and test display item and whose 
length is the confidence that the model has about the accuracy of that difference calculation. To 
make a ‘change’ decision, the vector must be sufficiently different and sufficiently confident. 
The response that the model generates is determined by an algorithm that sets thresholds on these 
two values which linearly scale with SS. Swan and Wyble (2014) also demonstrated how this 
same process could generate color reproduction responses, suggesting this a general process that 
can be used to both recollect items from memory and compare the recollected value with an 
available perceptual input. It should be noted that the DF model engages in a similar comparison 
process, but generates active neural responses based on non-linear neural dynamics without the 
need for a separate comparison algorithm. 
More recent debates about whether VWM is best explained via slots or resources have 
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examined color reproduction responses. Other variations of neural models discussed above have 
simulated these type of data using neural units that bind features and spatial locations (Oberauer 
& Lin, 2017; Swan & Wyble, 2014). In these models, the spatial or featural cue in the task is 
used to recollect a color or line orientation value from memory. Although the model we 
presented here has not been used to generate color reproduction responses, the model can be 
adapted in this direction (Johnson et al., 2014). For example, Johnson et al. (submitted) tested a 
novel prediction of the DF model that similar items in VWM should be repelled from one 
another during short-term delays and this should be reflected in color reproduction estimates. 
Recent extensions of the DF model have also been used to explain how object features are bound 
into integrated object representations (Gregor Schoner et al., 2016).  
Although there are ways in which DFT is unique, it also shares considerable overlap with 
other theories. The neural mechanism of self-sustaining activation is similar to the mechanism 
used in models proposed by Edin and colleagues (Edin et al., 2009, 2007) and Wang and 
colleagues (Compte et al., 2000). Additionally, capacity limitations in the DF model arise from 
competitive dynamics instantiated through inhibition among active representations, similar to the 
neural model reported by Swan and Wyble (2014). The model also overlaps with concepts from 
the slots and resources frameworks. Specifically, the non-linear nature of peak formation bears 
similarity to the qualitative nature of slots. Relatedly, the width of peaks and their shifting over 
time leads to spread of variance that is consistent with resource accounts. Moreover, the gradual 
rise in activation for each peak is consistent with the idea of the gradual accumulation of 
information over time in resource models. It is notable that there are inconsistencies regarding 
whether a slots or a resources account fit different datasets (Sim, Jacobs, & Knill, 2012; Rouder 
et al., 2008; Donkin et al., 2013; van den Berg & Ma, 2017). Since the DF model has aspects 
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consistent with both approaches, the model may have the flexibility needed to bridge these 
disparate findings in the literature (for discussion, see Johnson et al., 2014).  
The DNF model presented here is relatively simple, but has been extensively used to 
examine VWM from childhood to older adults (Costello & Buss, 2018; Johnson, Spencer, Luck, 
et al., 2009; Simmering, 2016). Other applications have implemented a more elaborated model 
that captures aspects of visual attention, saccade planning, and spatial-transformations (Ross-
Sheehy, Schneegans, & Spencer, 2015; Schneegans, 2016; Schneegans et al., 2014). These 
models incorporate a similar network to the model we presented here, but embedded it within a 
broader architecture that binds visual features to multiple different spatial frames of reference 
and performs spatial transformation across these reference frames (Schneegans, 2016). For 
example, this DF model architecture has been used to explain how VWM is updated across how 
eye movements (Schneegans et al., 2014) and how spontaneous exploration of an array of visual 
stimuli can build a representation of a scene (Grieben et al., 2020). Other applications have 
explained how change detection can occur if the same color occupies multiple spatial locations 
and how changes can be detected if two colors swap locations as well as differences in 
performance across these scenarios (Schneegans et al., 2016). Future work using the model-
based fMRI methods we describe here can explore how this fuller architecture accounts for 
patterns of cortical activation.  
Limitations and future directions 
It is important to highlight several limitations of the integrative cognitive neuroscience 
approach used here as well as future directions. One issue that will need to be addressed by 
future work is the strong collinearity between regressors generated from the model. The DF 
model is dominated by recurrent interactions meaning that many properties of the pattern of 
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activation, such as the timing or duration, are likely to be shared across components. The 
approach used here could be strengthened by designing tasks that are not only optimized for 
fMRI but also optimized from the perspective of the theory to be tested so that the regressors 
from a model are as independent as possible.  
Beyond such challenges, this work presents an important step forward in understanding 
brain-behavior relationships that opens up new avenues of future research. In particular, we are 
currently using this method to determine if model-based fMRI can adjudicate between competing 
neural process models to determine which provides a better explanation of brain data. If different 
models use different neural mechanisms or processes to produce the same pattern of behavior, 
can the Bayesian MLM and model-based fMRI methods be used to determine which model 
provides a better explanation of the functional brain data? 
We are also exploring the transferability of models. One way to achieve this might be to 
use one model to simulate two different tasks. If cortical fields implemented by the model 
correspond directly to processing in specific ROIs, we would expect the same field to map onto 
the same ROI across tasks. However, it is also possible that the function of specific cortical fields 
might be softly-assembled from interactions among different ROIs in the brain. In this case, the 
function implemented by a cortical field might correspond to different ROIs across different 
tasks. This exploration can determine whether the architecture of a model reflects the 
architecture of the brain, or if the functional mapping is more complex. 
Future work can also explore the relationship between the DF model and the large body 
of work examining VWM processes with EEG and ERP. Such efforts would complement the 
work presented here by evaluating the fine-grained temporal predictions of the model. The model 
is implemented with distinct neural processes corresponding to excitatory and inhibitory 
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interactions; thus, the model is well-positioned to generate simulated voltage changes and 
previous reports have provided initial comparisons between DF model activation and 
electrophysiological measures (Spencer, Barich, Goldberg, & Perone, 2012). 
Lastly, we are also exploring the brain-behavior relationship using other metrics of 
behavioral performance. In this project, we focused on accuracy as a measure of performance; 
however, reaction time can also be informative of the processes underlying VWM. Although the 
model’s behavior unfolds in real-time and previous DF models have been used to simulate 
reaction time as a target beahvior, the current model was not optimized to fit patterns of reaction 
time, nor was the task optimized to reveal differences in reaction times across memory loads. 
Future work can use this behavioral metric to further constrain model parameters and potentially 
reveal novel aspects of the neural dynamics of VWM.  
In conclusion, the DF account of VWM and change detection links behavioral and 
neuroimaging data in a new – and direct – way. We showed how a model that was initially 
constrained by behavioral data predicted patterns of fMRI data from a novel change detection 
paradigm, outperforming standard methods of analysis. The predicted and experimentally 
confirmed neural signatures of both correct and incorrect performance shed new light on the 
functional role of IPS, as well as lending support to the role of the TPJ in VWM maintenance. 
Critically, these functional neural signatures provide support for the neural dynamic account, 
contrasting with classic accounts of the origin of errors in change detection upon which more 
recent models are based. The model-based fMRI approach also raises new questions. For 
instance, how specific is the mapping between the different activation fields in the DF 
architecture and cortical sites in the brain? Integrating multiple different tasks within a single 
model and a single neural data set may be a way to address such questions about the mapping of 
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Table 2: Log Bayes factors across models for all subjects. 
 
Participant Null Set size Accuracy Change SS*Acc SS*Ch SS*Ch*Acc DF 
1 813.1 447.9 402.3 388.2 526.7 530.7 464.7 638* 
2 986.2 421.9 357.7 348.2 514.4 510.3 410.7 635.9* 
3 1002 158.1 67.1 76.3 267.7 271.4 120.9 454.6* 
4 583.7 18.5 -47.8* -42 103.2 115.1 19.8 245.6 
5 529 167.2 94.3 127.8 214.3 252.3 135.1 302.1* 
6 604.8 180.7 102.8 122.9 251.6 293.5 177.1 414.5* 
7 844.8 -39.3 -91 -106.7* 91.5 63.3 -34 251.5 
8 230.9 -80.8 -131.8 -141.5* -9.7 -6.4 -90.5 88.7 
9 460.6 -15.1 -86* -79.4 56.6 69.5 -42.2 170.8 
10 286.1 284.9 278.9 281.2 285.7 286.8 281 286.5* 
11 1381 457 383.2 407.9 580.7 603.3 487.5 804.8* 
12 1052 298.4 243.9 260.1 400.1 419 333.7 596.9* 
13 261.2 115.1 58.4 58.5 157.7 178.9 102.9 202* 
14 1207 317 255.6 286.2 471.2 496.1 384.4 755.8* 
15± 420.9 54.6 -12.1* -1.4 123.9 128.2 39.8 231.7 
16± 691.1 68.5 -19.6* 21 177 215 77.2 392.7 
Preferred model is indicated by *. Negative values indicate cases in which a categorical model 
outperformed the DF model. The reduced DF model with three components was preferred by 








Figure 1 | Illustration of activation dynamics. A-B, the phase-space and activation over time 
of a neuron with linear dynamics. The purple line in panel A corresponds to the period of time in 
panel B during which activation is boosted by an input, the red line in panel A corresponds to the 
other time points. C-D, the phase-space and activation over time of a neuron with non-linear 
dynamics created through the addition of self-excitation (note the curves in phase-space around 
the activation value of 0). When the neuron is boosted by an input in panel D, self-excitation 
creates a non-linearity which pulls activation fluctuations push activation back below 0 and self-
exitation is disengaged. E-F, corresponding activation profiles for these two different systems in 




Figure 2 | Model architecture. Excitatory connections are indicated by lines with pointed end 
and inhibitory connections are illustrated with lines with balled end. Connections with parallel 
lines (i.e., between “Different” and CF and between “Same” and WM) are engaged when the 
Gate node is activated. Connections with perpendicular lines (i.e., from CF to WM) are turned 





Figure 3 | Model dynamics. A, activation of the model architecture on a set-size 3 trial. B, 
activation of the decision nodes over the course the trial. C-D, time-slices from CF and WM at 
the offset of the memory array (note the corresponding boxes in Panel A). E-F, time-slices from 
CF and WM during the presentation of the test array (note the corresponding boxes in Panel A). 
In this trial, a different color value is presented during the test array (note the above-threshold 
activation in Panel E) and the model responds “different” (note the activation profile of the 












Figure 4 | Model performing different trial types. A, the model correctly performing a “same” 
trial. At the offset of the memory array, the WM field has built peaks corresponding to the four 
items in the memory array. During test when the same item are presented, activation in CF stays 
below threshold (note the asterisks above CF). Here, the model responds “same” (note the 
activation of the decision nodes). B, the model correctly performing a “different” trial. Now, 
during the test array, a new item is presented which goes above threshold in CF (note the asterisk 
above CF). C, the model performing a “same” trial but generating an incorrect response. At the 
offset of the memory array, the WM field has failed to consolidate one of the items into memory 
(note the asterisk above WM). Subsequently, during the presentation of the same items during 
the test array, the corresponding stimulus goes above threshold in CF (note the asterisk above 
CF) and the model generates a “different” response. D, the model performing a “different” trial 
but generating an incorrect response. In this example, the model has overly robust activation with 
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the WM field which leads to stronger inhibition within CF and a failure of the new item to go 















Figure 5 | Illustration model activation dynamics and hemodynamics. A, B, D, and F, 
stimulated local field potential (solid lines) and corresponding hemodynamic responses (dashed 
lines) from the “same” node (A), “different” node (B), CF (D) and WM (F). C, E, and G, 
activation of model components over a series of 8 trials (note the labels at the bottom which 




Figure 6 | Simulations of Todd & Marois (2004). A, Behavioral performance and model 
simulations. B, BOLD response from IPS across memory loads of 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 8 items (left) 
and simulated hemodynamic response from CF layer (right). C, Simulated hemodynamic 








Figure 7 | Simulations of Magen et al. (2009). A, Behavioral performance and model 
simulations. B, BOLD response from PPC across memory loads of 1, 3, 5, and 7 items (left) and 
simulated hemodynamic response from CF layer (right). C, Simulated hemodynamic response 








Figure 8 | Task design and behavioral / simulation data. A, A trial began with a sample array 
consisting of 2, 4, or 6 colored items. Next came a retention interval and presentation of a test 
array. On change trials (50% of trials), one randomly-selected item was shifted 36° in color 
space. B, Percent correct from behavioral study. C, Percent correct from fMRI study. In both 
studies, there were many errors at set-size four, but performance was above chance (t(27)=23.5, 




Figure 9 | Average amplitude of hemodynamic response across model components and trial 
types. This figure shows the variations in the amplitude of the hemodynamic response when 
perofrming our version of the change detection task (correct change trial = hit; correct same trial 






Figure 10 | Mapping of model components to ROIs. A, Yellow spheres show ROIs which 
corresponded to CF and red spheres show ROIs which corresponded to WM+“same”. B-C, 
Time-course plots showing the BOLD response and predicted time-courses from the DF model 
and from the accuracy categorical model within regions that were mapped by DF components. A 
participant is shown that preferred the DF model (P1) and a participant that preferred the 
accuracy categorical model (P8). D, The same time-courses and participants are shown within a 
region that was not mapped by a DF component. E, Scatter plot showing the correlation between 





Figure 11 | Relative model precision. Average improvement in model precision for the DF 
model relative to the array of categorical models. Top panel shows relative improvement in 
model precision within the 23 ROIs. Yellow (CF) and red (WM+‘same’) arrows mark regions 
that were mapped to components of the DF model. Bottom panel shows relative improvement in 
model precision by participant. Arrows indicate participants that preferred a categorical model 
over the DF model with four components. Grey arrows indicate participants that switched to 









Figure 12 | Activation and model prediction across trial-types within lIPS. Activation (solid) 
and model predictions for the DF (dotted) and change categorical (dashed) models is plotted 
across trial-types and different set sizes. Left graphs represent activation for a participant that 
preferred the DF model. Right graphs represent activation for a participant that preferred the 
change categorical model. The bar graphs show the average absolute difference between 






Figure 13 | Relative differences between activation in lIPS and model predictions by trial-
type. We first calculated the absolute average difference between activation and model 
predictions for the DF model, accuracy categorical model, and change categorical model within a 
10 second window for each trial type (as visualized in Figure 12). Next, the difference for the DF 
model was subtracted from the difference of each categorical model. Positive values, then, reflect 
instances where the categorical model deviated from observed activation more so than the DF 
model. Negative values indicate instances in which the DF model deviated from observed 
activation more so than the categorical model. 
 
  
 
